University of Tennessee Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications
9-2020

(In)Formal Marriage Equality
Michael J. Higdon

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

University of Tennessee College of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Michael J Higdon

September, 2020

(In)Formal Marriage Equality
Michael J Higdon

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/michael_higdon/23/

Research Paper #397
September 2020

(In)Formal Marriage Equality
Michael J. Higdon

Fordham Law Review (Forthcoming)

This paper may be downloaded without charge
from the Social Science Research Network Electronic library at

http://ssrn.com/abstract=3655687

Learn more about the University of Tennessee College of Law:
law.utk.edu

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655687

(IN)FORMAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY
Michael J. Higdon*
ABSTRACT
In 2015, same-sex couples throughout the United States obtained formal
marriage equality. But is the prospective ability to obtain marriage licenses
sufficient to achieve Obergefell’s promise of equality? What about
individuals whose same-sex relationship did not survive—either through
death or dissolution—to see marriage equality become the law of the land?
Or those who did ultimately wed but now have a marriage that appears to be
artificially short when considering just how long the couple has actually been
together in a marriage-like relationship? With marriage benefits conditioned
not only on the fact of marriage but also the length of marriage, individuals
in both categories continue to suffer harm as a result of the unconstitutional
laws that prevented them from marrying at an earlier point in time. Although
some states have attempted to remedy this problem by backdating same-sex
marriages, the reality is that the availability of such relief varies by state and,
even so, no state has yet to formulate a test to adequately protect the interests
of those individuals. This Article is the first to propose a specific solution to
these problems—a solution that requires states to formulate and adopt a new
equitable remedy, referred to here as Equitable Marriage. Drawing upon
existing equitable doctrines that states have already developed to extend
formal family law benefits to those in informal family-like relationships,
Equitable Marriage would treat same-sex relationships that pre-dated formal
marriage equality as the equivalent of a legal marriage with all the attendant
rights and obligations. In the case of same-sex couples who ultimately wed,
Equitable Marriage would require that this time count as part of the formal
marriage so as to extend all marital benefits conditioned on length of
marriage. To succeed, claimants would need to establish that the couple
would have wed during that time period but for the unconstitutional laws
depriving them of that fundamental right. Understanding the complexity of
such an approach, this Article offers guidance on how courts should
implement and apply Equitable Marriage so as to achieve full marriage
equality while, at the same time, resisting impermissible gender stereotypes
and heterosexist notions of how marriage “should” look.
*

Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law, University of
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“I made sure to add ‘and days past’ in our vows because by the time we
got married, we had already lived together for 42 years. You can’t forget
that”1 –Edith Windsor, named plaintiff in U.S. v. Windsor
INTRODUCTION
On three separate occasions, the United States has witnessed large,
discrete groups of adults simultaneously earning the right to marry the person
of their choice—a right that had been denied them for many years. The first
occurred after passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, which cleared the way
for former slaves to finally enter into legal marriages.2 The second came in
1967 after the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia struck down
anti-miscegenation laws in the sixteen states that still prohibited interracial
marriage.3 The third example, which forms the basis of this Article, came in
2015 when the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges ushered in
marriage equality for same-sex couples throughout the United States.4 In each
instance, those couples impacted by the change in law were now permitted to
solemnize their relationships and, thus, enjoy all the legal protections that
flow from formal marriage. At the same time, each prompted the question of
what, if any, legal effect was to be given those couples that spent time in a
quasi-marital state while awaiting the right to legally wed. After all, to ignore
those years altogether would lead to a number of legal harms—harms
inconsistent with the ideal of true marriage equality.5
To illustrate, consider Michael Ely and James Taylor, who met in 1971
when Michael was eighteen and James was twenty.6 The two men became
involved and would spend the next forty-three years together, living first in
California and later in Arizona. In October 2014, five days after U.S. District
1

Corinne Werder, 20 Epic Edie Windsor Quotes To Always Remember Her By, Go
Magazine (Sept. 13, 2017): https://medium.com/@lesbiantech/11-quotes-from-our-heroedie-windsor-at-lesbians-who-tech-new-york-4d7d0e8c9f6b
2
Prior to emancipation, slaves were permitted to “marry,” but such unions had
absolutely no legal effect: “As chattel, slaves were objects, not subjects. Marriage for them
was not an inviolable union between two people, but an institution defined and controlled by
the superior relationship of slave to master.” TERA W. HUNTER, BOUND IN WEDLOCK: SLAVE
AND FREE BLACK MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 6 (2017)
3
388 U.S. 1 (1967); see Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans
on Interracial Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2746 (2008)
(“Despite the moral and practical untenability of antimiscegenation laws, they remained in
place in sixteen states (all of them in the South) by the time the Supreme Court decided
Loving v. Virginia.”).
4
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
5
See infra Part II.A.
6
The details of this case are all taken from the complaint filed on their behalf by Lambda
Legal. See https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/legal-docs/ely_az_20181120_complaint.
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Court Judge John Sedgwick ruled that Arizona’s prohibition on same-sex
marriage was unconstitutional,7 the two men obtained a marriage license and
married just two weeks later. Sadly, their legal marriage would only last six
months because, in May of 2015, James died of cancer at the age of sixtythree. Michael, devastated by the loss of his partner of over forty years, also
suffered financially given that the couple primarily relied on James’s
employment for income. Michael filed for Social Security benefits as James’s
surviving spouse, but his application was denied because of a provision in the
Social Security Act that requires a surviving spouse to have been married to
the “insured individual” for nine months in order to qualify for benefits.8
Owing to the timing of James’ death—but primarily to the fact the two men
had been legally prohibited from getting married for the majority of their
relationship—Michael was three months shy of meeting that requirement.
Ely and Taylor represent but one of the many same-sex couples whose
relationships began long before marriage equality was even a consideration,
much less a reality. For those couples that were ultimately able to wed, their
marriage licenses bestowed legal benefits that had been denied them for many
years. For instance, James Obergefell, the named plaintiff in the case
responsible for securing this new freedom, had been living in a marriage-like
relationship with his partner for twenty-two years.9 Similarly, Edith
Windsor, the woman responsible for ending that portion of the Defense of
Marriage Act that excluded same-sex spouses from the federal definition of
“spouse,”10 had been with her partner forty years before the two were finally
permitted to marry.11 Other same-sex couples never even got that opportunity
as, in many cases, individuals died before they could legally marry the person
they had been waiting to wed. The question that emerges then is what remedy
should apply to those in same-sex relationships who were either never
permitted to wed or those whose eventual marriage fails to capture the true
length of their relationship.
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy spoke of the “constellation of benefits”12
that marriage affords, and two years later, the Court reiterated that “a State
may not exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and

7

See Connolly v. Jeanes, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (D. Ariz. 2014)
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), (f), 416(c), (g).
9
Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage Equality
Continued, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. S52, S60 (2015).
10
See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
11
Edith Windsor and her partner, Thea Spyer, were wed in 2007 in Canada. See id. at
749. See also Christine L. Nemacheck, The Path to Obergefell: Saying "I Do" to New
Judicial Federalism?, 54 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 149, 163 (2017) (noting that, prior to
marrying, the couple had been together for over forty years).
12
135 S. Ct. at 2601.
8
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conditions as opposite-sex couples.”13 As the example that began this Article
illustrates, however, a number of marital benefits are tied not just to the fact
of marriage, but to the length of the marriage.14 Accordingly, if states are to
comply with Obergefell’s directive, there must be some accounting for the
time same-sex couples spent in relationships that—but for the legal
prohibitions against it—would have been marriages. And this requirement
must apply to those who were precluded from ever marrying as well as those
same-sex spouses who first spent time in a quasi-marital state awaiting that
right. To do otherwise would permit an unconstitutional law—the kind
Justice Scalia has described as “void, and is as no law”15—to continue to
harm the very population on whose behalf the law was struck down. Such a
result is impermissible. As the Supreme Court has made clear, when a law is
deemed unconstitutional, “that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct
review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or
postdate our announcement of the rule.”16
Whereas other scholars have noted this need for some form of retroactive
application of Obergefell,17 there is as of yet no formulation of how exactly
courts should do that. And to the extent courts have wrestled with this issue,
they have taken vastly different approaches and have arrived at opposite
conclusions.18 A few have given effect to the time same-sex couples spent in
relationships while awaiting the right to formally wed, doing so either
through laws relating to common law marriage or by looking into whether
the couple would have married earlier had that option been available to
them.19 Others have simply refused to go beyond the dates of a legal marriage,
thus refusing to grant any legal significance to time spent in a pre-equality
relationship, regardless of how long that relationship lasted or the severity of
the harms that would result from failing to count that time.20 Thus, true
marriage equality remains a work in progress, which is problematic not only
for the continued discrimination faced by those who—pre-Obergefell—spent
13

Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017).
See infra Part II.A.
15
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 760 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (1995)
(quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879)).
16
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (emphasis added).
17
See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Backdating Marriage, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 395 (2017); Charles
W. Rhodes, Loving Retroactivity, 45 FLA. S. L. REV. 383 (2018); Mark Strasser, Obergefell,
Retroactivity, and Common Law Marriage, 9 NE. U.L. REV. 379 (2017); Lee-Ford Tritt,
Moving Forward by Looking Back: The Retroactive Application of Obergefell, 2016 WISC.
L. REV. 873.
18
See infra Part II.B.
19
Id.
20
See infra notes 163-171 and accompanying text.
14
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time in committed, same-sex relationships, but the fact that the right to marry
is a constitutionally protected right and, as such, some standards are required.
After all, “it is the nature of a constitution to set outer limits to legislative
competence.”21
There are, however, a number of thorny questions associated with any
attempt to backdate same-sex marriages. For instance, how does the law
determine when a premarital relationship became sufficiently “marriagelike” to warrant counting some portion of it toward the length of the eventual
marriage? Relatedly, how can the law accurately determine when a same-sex
couple would have married had they been given the opportunity? Further,
given the discrimination faced by the LGBTQ community, many of them
might have kept their relationships secret, making it difficult for them to now
prove the earlier existence of a “marriage-like” relationship. Finally, given
the heteronormative foundation of marriage,22 what does “marriage-like”
even mean anymore, especially when applied to a group of Americans whom
society has for decades conditioned to view marriage as a social institution
reserved for people who are unlike them.23 As one commentator said after
witnessing marriage equality in the Netherlands in 1998: “[I]t was an
amazing feeling . . . because I had never imagined that possibility.”24
It is the goal of this Article to provide answers to those questions. In so
doing, this Article seeks to offer a path forward for the states as they attempt
to give effect to the full promise of Obergefell. That path is made easier by
the fact that states already employ their inherent equitable powers to bestow
family law protections upon informal relationships that arose outside the legal
requirements for family formation.25 Although none provide an adequate
remedy in this context, they are nonetheless instructive when it comes to
fashioning a new equitable doctrine that would adequately address the time
same-sex couples spent in marriage-like relationships while awaiting
marriage equality. Essentially, that doctrine—referred to here as Equitable
Marriage—would treat that time as either a legal marriage or, in the case of
same-sex couples who ultimately wed, as part of the formal marriage if the
21

Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a
Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 798 (1964).
22
Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality's Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1371 (2005)
(referencing “[m]arriage's heteronormative roots”).
23
See Yuvraj Joshi, Respectable Queerness, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415, 444
(2012) (“[I]t appears implausible that the law, once it has recognized same-sex marriage, will
develop a more nuanced understanding of sexuality that undercuts its heteronormative
assumptions.”).
24
Laura J. Kendall, Dancing with My Grandma: Talking with Robyn Ochs About
Complex Identities and Simple Messages in the Marriage Equality Movement, in
BISEXUALITY AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 181, 199 (M. Paz Galupo ed., 2008).
25
See infra Part III.
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claimant could establish that the couple would have wed during that time
period but for the unconstitutional laws depriving them of that fundamental
right.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I chronicles the history of formal
marriage equality in the United States as it applies to same-sex couples. Part
II then turns to informal marriage equality, focusing on how Obergefell
stands for the proposition that, going forward, states must do more than
simply issue marriage licenses in order to remedy the unconstitutional denial
of same-sex couple’s right to marry. In so doing, Part II explores the marital
benefits tied to marriage, particularly those tied to length of marriage, and
how states have attempted to answer the question of whether Obergefell
demands retroactive application. Part III proposes the need for an equitable
remedy that, in some form or another, all states must adopt. To understand
that need and what form the remedy might take, Part III details similar
equitable remedies that courts have previously relied upon in order to provide
family law benefits to family-like relationships. Part IV then explores how
the proposed remedy—referred to here as Equitable Marriage—would
provide similar protections to those marriages that fail to account for informal
relationships that would have been marriages had legal prohibitions not
prevented solemnization. As part of that proposal, Part IV examines how
courts might apply Equitable Marriage, offering potential solutions to the
complications and objections any such remedy will inevitably bring.
I. THE PATH TO FORMAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY
In 1967, when the Supreme Court struck down state laws that prohibited
individuals from marrying someone of another race, the Court identified
“freedom of choice” as an implicit component of the right to marry.26 That
case was, of course, Loving v. Virginia, and five years later, Richard Baker
and James McConnell would rely on it when they became the first same-sex
couple to challenge discriminatory marriage laws.27 The two men had sought
a marriage license under Minnesota law, which did not explicitly require the
two parties to be of the opposite sex.28 Nonetheless, their application was
26

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires that
the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.”).
27
Anthony Michael Kreis, Stages of Constitutional Grief: Democratic Constitutionalism
and the Marriage Revolution, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 871, 881 (2018) (“Baker and McConnell
alleged Minnesota's marriage law ran afoul of the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.”).
28
See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (1971) (“Petitioners contend, first, that the
absence of an express statutory prohibition against same-sex marriages evinces a legislative
intent to authorize such marriages.”).
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denied, and the two men subsequently brought suit, arguing that “the right to
marry without regard to the sex of the parties is a fundamental right of all
persons and that restricting marriage to only couples of the opposite sex is
irrational and invidiously discriminatory.”29
Baker and McConnell lost at both the trial court and on appeal to the
state supreme court.30 In ruling, the Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected the
plaintiffs’ reliance on Loving, holding that “in commonsense and in a
constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction
based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in
sex.”31 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the two men would
lose once more, this time with a mere one-sentence summary disposition:
“The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.”32 And
with that, the nation’s first legal challenge to state laws that prevented
individuals from marrying a person of the same-sex would come to an end.
For the most part, the issue would lie dormant for the next twenty years.
Then, in 1990, something happened that would cause the issue of same-sex
marriage to “burst into the consciousness of the American public.”33
Specifically, three same-sex couples in Hawaii decided to apply for marriage
licenses.34 When their applications were denied, the couples filed suit,
arguing that Hawaii’s marriage law, which “restrict[ed] the marital relation
to a male and a female,”35 was in violation of Hawaii’s constitution.36 The
trial court dismissed the case.37 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Hawaii,
however, the court ruled that, although there was no fundamental right to
29

Id. at 312.
Id.
31
Id. at 315.
32
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
33
Arthur S. Leonard, Going for the Brass Ring: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage 82
Cornell L. Rev. 572 (1997); see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality,
Workplace Inequality: The Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2015)
([W]hen the Hawaii Supreme Court shocked the nation in 1993 and ruled in favor of Nina
Baehr's petition to marry her female partner in Baehr v. Lewin, the issue of same-sex
marriage drew prominent national attention.”); David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff,
Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q.
523, 526 (1999) (noting how the Hawaii opinion “stirred by far the most attention, for it led
to the first appellate decision in the United States suggesting that same-sex couples were
constitutionally entitled to marry and produced a seismic political reaction in Hawaii and the
mainland”).
34
See Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 506 (1994)
(“In December 1990, three same-sex couples-Ninia Baehr and Genora Dancel, Tammy
Rodrigues and Antoinette Pregil, and Pat Lagon and Joseph Melilio-applied to Hawaii's
Department of Health for marriage licenses.”).
35
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993)
36
Id. at 49-50.
37
Id. at 52.
30
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same-sex marriage, under the Hawaii Constitution “sex is a ‘suspect
category’ for purposes of equal protection analysis.”38 For that reason, the
court held that the state’s discriminatory definition of marriage was
presumptively unconstitutional, and the state could only rebut that
presumption by a showing that “(a) the statute's sex-based classification is
justified by compelling state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgements of the applicant couples' constitutional
rights.”39
On remand, Hawaii Circuit Judge Kevin S.C. Chang ruled that the state
failed to rebut the presumption and issued an injunction that prevented the
state from denying licenses solely because the applicants were of the same
sex.40 Thus, in what was now 1996, Hawaii seemed poised to become the first
state to recognize same-sex marriage. However, pending appeal, Judge
Chang issued a stay of his order, and that appeal was subsequently mooted in
1998 when Hawaii voters passed a constitutional amendment, providing that
“[t]he legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples."41 Americans did not know it at the time, but it would be another
eight years before a state would legalize same-sex marriage, and it would not
be Hawaii.42
Nonetheless, the fact that Hawaii had even considered legalizing samesex marriage caused great consternation among many of the other states, and
the response was swift.43 With the assumption that same-sex marriages
performed in one state would potentially be entitled to full faith and credit in
all others,44 many states took what they hoped would be preemptive action
and began the process of amending their constitutions to define marriage as
being between one man and one woman.45 The hope was that, in so doing,
38

Id. at 67.
Id.
40
Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
41
Haw. Const. art. I, §23
42
See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
43
See Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1157 (2009) (noting how events in
Hawaii “ignited the national backlash against same-sex marriage).
44
See Brian H. Bix, State Interest and Marriage-the Theoretical Perspective, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 105–06 (2003) (“[T]he combination of national citizenship (as
enforced by the Full Faith and Credit Clause) and the usual rules of recognizing marriages
validly celebrated in another state, meant that . . . there was a fear . . . that all other states
would have to recognize same-sex unions celebrated in Hawaii.”).
45
See William Buss & Emily Buss, Escaping the American Blot? A Comparative Look
at Federalism in Australia and the United States Through the Lens of Family Law, 48
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 105, 133 n.151 (2015) (“Within twelve years of the Hawaii Supreme
Court's ruling, many states, including Hawaii, had added an express ban on same-sex
marriage to their laws, and a majority of these prohibitions were ultimately adopted as
39
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the state could refuse to recognize “marriages” that did not comply.
Eventually, thirty-one states passed such amendments.46 Alabama, for
example, passed the “Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment,” which
provided that “[t]he State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any
marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have
occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a
marriage license was issued.”47 Voters in the state passed the amendment by
eighty-one percent of the vote.48
As political pressure mounted, Congress became involved and, in 1996,
passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).49 The act had two main
purposes.50 The first was to declare that no state would be required to
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.51 Second, DOMA
provided that, when it came to federal law “the word 'marriage' means only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
a wife.”52 In other words, to the extent federal law conditioned marriage
benefits on whether the couple was married in their state of residence, the
federal government would exclude any same-sex marriages a state might
recognize. Congress took this step even though at that time same-sex
marriage was not recognized anywhere in the United States.53
constitutional amendments.”); Julie L. Davies, State Regulation of Same-Sex Marriage, 7
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1079, 1080 (2006) (“Following the first failure of a statute banning
marriage for same-sex couples in Hawaii, states began turning to state constitutional
amendments to restrict marriage.”).
46
Kenneth P. Miller, Defining Rights in the States: Judicial Activism and Popular
Response, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2061, 2087–88 (2013) (“Over time, voters in thirty-one states
have approved constitutional amendments expressly limiting the definition of marriage to a
union between a man and a woman or, in Hawaii's case, authorizing the legislature to do
so.”).
47
ALA. CONST. ART. I, § 36.03.
48
See Dave Woods, Crosspollination of Same-Sex Parental Rights Post-DOMA: The
Subtle Solution, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1651, 1677 (2014).
49
Mark A. Tumeo, Civil Rights for Gays and Lesbians and Domestic Partner Benefits:
How Far Could an Ohio Municipality Go?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 169 (2003) (“In 1996,
the United States Congress capitulated to political pressure from the conservative religious
right and passed the Defense of Marriage Act (hereinafter DOMA).”)
50
See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 752 (2013) (noting that “DOMA contains
two operative sections”).
51
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) (“No State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State.”).
52
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
53
See Lee-Ford Tritt, supra note 17, at 881 (“Notably, at the time DOMA was enacted,
neither same-sex marriage nor polygamous marriage was legal in any state, territory, or
possession of the United States.”).
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Nonetheless, just as events in Hawaii galvanized efforts to block
nationwide marriage equality, members of the LGBTQ community began to
hope that something many of them had assumed would never happen in their
lifetime might instead become reality.54 As a result, after losing in Hawaii, a
number of activists began to target other states. Just one year after Hawaii
passed its constitutional amendment, those advocates scored a new victory
when Vermont ruled that its prohibition on same-sex marriage violated the
state’s constitution, ordering the legislature “to consider and enact legislation
consistent with” the “Common Benefits Clause” of the state constitution.55
The court did note, however, that “[w]hether this ultimately takes the form of
inclusion within the marriage laws themselves or a parallel ‘domestic
partnership’ system or some equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the
Legislature.”56 In 2000, the Vermont legislature would adopt the latter
approach, making Vermont—if not the first state to allow same-sex
marriage—the first to institute civil unions for same-sex partners.57
After Vermont, progress toward legalized same-sex marriage slowed for
a few years. Then, in 2003, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lawrence
v. Texas.58 On its face, the case merely concerned the constitutionality of
Texas’ sodomy law, which criminalized homosexual but not heterosexual
sodomy—a law that, according to the Court, implicated “liberty of the person
both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”59 Basing its
decision on the Due Process and Equal Protection provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court ruled that the law was unconstitutional. In
so ruling, the Court noted that “the fact that the governing majority in a State
has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,”60 explicitly overruling

54

See Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and
Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1092 (2014) (noting how the decision
“provided a glimmer of hope for same-sex couples that their country, or at least their state,
might recognize their relationships in their lifetimes.”); Tina C. Campbell, The
"Determination of Marriage Act": A Reasonable Response to the Discriminatory "Defense
of Marriage Act", 58 LOY. L. REV. 939, 946 (2012) (noting how Baehr v. Lewin brought
hope to the same-sex marriage movement).
55
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999). That clause provides as follows: “That
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of
the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any
single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community.” Vt. Const.,
ch. I, art 7.
56
744 A.2d at 867.
57
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204 (West 2010)
58
539 U.S. 558 (2001).
59
Id. at 562.
60
Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.61
The Court was careful to try and limit the reach of Lawrence. In fact,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion went so far as to proclaim that “[t]he present case
does not . . . involve whether the government must give formal recognition
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”62 To that point,
however, Scalia dissented, saying “Do not believe it”:63
Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional
law that has permitted a distinction to be made between
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal
recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate
state interest” for purposes of proscribing that conduct; and
if . . . “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring,” what
justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits
of marriage to homosexual couples exercising “[t]he liberty
protected by the Constitution”?64
Scalia was not the only one to interpret the Lawrence majority opinion in this
manner. Writing shortly after the opinion was released, a case summary in
the Harvard Law Review had this to say about the opinion: “Lawrence
suggests that remaining forms of government-sanctioned anti-gay
discrimination—including laws barring same-sex marriage, gay adoption,
and service in the armed forces by gays and lesbians who acknowledge their
sexual orientation—must either be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
government purpose or be invalidated.”65
In fact, just a few months after Lawrence was issued, Massachusetts
would become the first state to formally extend marriage equality to samesex couples.66 In its 2003 decision, Goodridge v. Department of Public
61

Id. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.
It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.”).
62
Id. at 578; see also John G. Culhane, Marriage, Tort, and Private Ordering: Rhetoric
and Reality in LGBT Rights, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 437, 461 (2009) (“For all of its affirming
language and sympathetic tone, though, Lawrence also reiterates—via needless dictum—
that the case is not about marriage.”).
63
539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64
Id. at 604-05.
65
The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 297, 298 (2003)
66
See Douglas Nejaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital
Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87, 166 (2014) (describing
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Health, the state’s highest court ruled that “barring an individual from the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that
person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts
Constitution.”67 In so ruling, the court quoted Lawrence: “Our obligation is
to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”68 When it
came to fashioning a remedy, the court did not strike down Massachusetts’
existing marriage laws but instead borrowed an approach from the highest
court in Ontario, Canada, which held: “The appropriate remedy is to declare
invalid the existing definition of marriage to the extent that it refers to ‘one
man and one woman’ and to reformulate the definition of marriage as ‘the
voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others.’”69
Unlike Vermont, the Massachusetts court did not give the legislature the
option of creating civil unions and, on May 17, 2004, Massachusetts began
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.70
Now that one state had officially extended the right to marry to same-sex
couples, more states began to pass constitutional amendments aimed at
insulating them from having to recognize same-sex marriages performed in
other states. That would not stop other states, however, from following
Massachusetts’ lead. In 2008, the highest courts in Connecticut71 and
California72 likewise ruled that the state constitutions protected the rights of
same-sex couples to wed. In so ruling, the Connecticut high court rejected
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as “the first state supreme court decision opening
marriage to same-sex couples”).
67
798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
68
Id. at 948 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2001)).
69
Halpern v. Toronto (City), (2003) 172 O.A.C. 276, para. 148. The Goodridge court
“concur[red] with this remedy, which is entirely consonant with established principles of
jurisprudence empowering a court to refine a common-law principle in light of evolving
constitutional standards.” 798 N.E.2d at 969.
70
See Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005)
(“For the plaintiff couples in the Goodridge case, May 17 was the most important day of
their lives . . . . Others, too, were overwhelmed by the power of the government to
acknowledge our humanity and our citizenship.”).
71
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
72
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). California would, however, cease
issuing marriage licenses in November of that year after voters passed Proposition 8, which
amended the California constitution to define marriage as involving one man and one
woman. See Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1297 (2010) (“The court, however, left intact the roughly eighteen
thousand marriages that had occurred between the Marriage Cases decision and the passage
of Proposition 8.”).
Same-sex marriage would not resume in California until 2013 when the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, which let stand the district court’s ruling that
Proposition 8 was unconstitutional. 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (holding that appellants lacked
standing to appeal the district court’s opinion).
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civil unions as an option for curing the constitutional violation: “Although
marriage and civil unions do embody the same legal rights under our law,
they are by no means equal. The former is an institution of transcendent
historical, cultural and social significance, whereas the latter is not.”73 The
following year, the Iowa Supreme Court would do the same, making it the
first Midwestern state to do so.74 Later that year, Vermont earned the
distinction of becoming the first state to legalize same-sex marriage not
because the state’s highest court demanded it, but through legislation—
legislation that would define marriage as “the legally recognized union of two
people.”75 From 2009 to 2012, three other states and the District of Columbia
would likewise pass legislation extending the right to marry to same-sex
couples.76
Although the same-sex marriage had thus far involved questions of state
law, the issue would take on federal constitutional dimensions in 2013 when
the Supreme Court struck down Section 3 of DOMA, which excludes samesex spouses from qualifying for federal marriage benefits.77 The case was
U.S. v. Windsor and involved a same-sex couple, Edith Windsor and Thea
Spyer, who had been in a relationship since 1963.78 The two women, who
lived in New York, where they registered as domestic partners in 1993, and
were married in Canada in 2007.79 In 2009, Spyer died, leaving her estate to
Windsor.80 Had Windsor been male, she could have taken advantage of the
marital exemption for federal estate tax, but because she was female, DOMA
denied her that marital benefit, forcing her to pay over $300,000 in estate
taxes.81 Thus, Windsor argued that DOMA was unconstitutional, and the
Supreme Court agreed, ruling that Section 3 was unconstitutional,
characterizing it as violative of “basic due process and equal protection
principles applicable to the Federal Government”:82
DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State
73

957 A.2d at 418.
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009)
75
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8. Previously, it had read “Marriage is the legally recognized
union of one man and one woman.” See Calvin Massey, Public Opinion, Cultural Change,
and Constitutional Adjudication, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1437, 1448 n.47 (2010).
76
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2615 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (identifying
Vermont, New Hampshire, New York and Washington, D.C.)
77
See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
78
570 U.S. 744, 753 (2013).
79
Id. Despite the fact they married in Canada, New York did recognize the validity of
their marriage. Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. (“Because DOMA denies federal recognition to same-sex spouses, Windsor did
not qualify for the marital exemption from the federal estate tax.”).
82
Id. at 769.
74
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entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their own
liberty. It imposes a disability on the class by refusing to
acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and
proper. DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all
persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including
their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the
marriages of others.83
The Court concluded that “[b]y seeking to displace this protection and
treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the
federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”84
On the heels of Windsor, the marriage equality movement gained
considerable steam. In his 2014 opinion in favor of marriage equality, Judge
Richard Gergel of the federal District of South Carolina noted that “[i]n the
approximately 17 months since the Windsor decision, federal courts in
virtually every circuit and in every state with a same sex marriage ban have
heard lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of such state law
provisions.”85 A majority of those courts, including four federal courts of
appeal, would ultimately rule in favor of same-sex couples looking to
marry.86 Notably, however, one appellate court—the Sixth Circuit—reached
the opposite conclusion and, in so doing, overturned lower court decisions in
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.87 In late 2014, the Sixth Circuit
issued its opinion, essentially holding that the voters and not the courts should
decide the issue of same-sex marriage—an approach the dissent characterized
as failing “to grapple with the relevant constitutional question.”88 That
decision was DeBoer v. Sydney, but once the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, it would be consolidated with another case and given a new name:
Obergefell v. Hodges.89
The Court would use Obergefell to finally address the larger question of
whether a state may constitutionally prohibit same-sex marriage.90 Although
83

Id. at 775.
Id. According to the Court, “the Fifth Amendment . . . withdraws from Government
the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does.” Id. at 774.
85
Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 582 (D.S.C. 2014).
86
Carl Tobias, Marriage Equality Comes to the Fourth Circuit, 75 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 2005, 2008 (2018) (“The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits affirmed district invalidations.”).
87
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 413 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Tom Watts, From
Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage Equality Continued, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. S52, S68 (2015) (noting that “the Sixth Circuit provided the desired circuit split”).
88
772 F.3d at 421 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
89
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
90
Id. at 2593.
84
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the Court had previously held that “the right to marry is protected by the
Constitution,”91 the precedent cases upon which that right had developed all
involved laws that had clearly “presumed a relationship involving oppositesex partners.”92 Nonetheless, in his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy held
that an analysis of those opinions “compels the conclusion that same-sex
couples may exercise the right to marry.”93 Specifically, the Court identified
four essential “principles and traditions” related to marriage that justified its
classification as a fundamental right—principles and traditions that,
according to the Court, “apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”94
First, going back to its decision in Loving, the Court noted that “the right
to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy,”95 recognizing that “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two
men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such
profound choices.”96 Second, according to the Court, marriage is a
fundamental right because the institution “supports a two-person union unlike
any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”97 Third, the Court
held that marriage “safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning
from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”98 Citing
Windsor, where the Court noted how laws prohibiting same-sex marriage
“harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples,”99 the Court explained
that “[b]y giving recognition and legal structure to their parents’ relationship,
marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of their
own family and its concord with other families in their community and in
their daily lives.’”100 Finally, the Court justified the fundamental nature of
the right to marry, noting that marriage is “the foundation of the family and
of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”101
91

Id. at 2598.
Id. at 2589. The Court did acknowledge, however, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810
(1972). See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. Obergefell, of course, overruled
Baker. Id. at 2605.
93
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. (“The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together
can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.”).
97
Id. As the Court explained, “[Marriage] offers the hope of companionship and
understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the
other.” Id.
98
Id. (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
99
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600-01.
100
Id. at 2600 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)) (“Marriage
also affords the permanency and stability important to children's best interests.”).
101
Id. at 2601 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
92
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Having distilled the right to marry into those four components, each of
which justifying its recognition as a fundamental right, the Court found no
basis for excluding same-sex couples from that right:
Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent
purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest
meaning. [Although the] limitation of marriage to oppositesex couples may long have seemed natural and just, . . . its
inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental
right to marry is now manifest. With that knowledge must
come the recognition that laws excluding same-sex couples
from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind
prohibited by our basic charter.102
Accordingly, the Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibits states from
denying same-sex couples the ability to marry on terms equal to those of
opposite-sex couples, paving the way for same-sex couples around the
country to immediately begin exercising their Constitutional right to marry—
something many of them had waited decades to do.
II. OBERGEFELL AND PRE-EQUALITY “MARRIAGES”
At its most basic level, Obergefell permitted same-sex couples to
prospectively enter into formal marriages. What it did not do was give legal
effect to the relationships they had entered into years earlier when marriage
was not an option.103 Thus the question arises as to whether those couples
were entitled to any credit for the time they had spent waiting for marriage
equality and, if so, how such credit was to be determined. After all, Obergefell
made clear that same-sex couples were not only entitled to the right to wed
but were likewise entitled to do so “on the same terms and conditions as
opposite-sex couples.”104 Just two years after Obergefell, the Court issued
Pavan v. Smith, a per curium order in which a majority reiterated that
understanding when it characterized Obergefell as being committed “to
provide same-sex couples ‘the constellation of benefits that the States have
linked to marriage.’”105
102

Id. at 2602.
See Rhodes, supra note 17, at 433 (“The Supreme Court could have exceeded the
presented issues and ordered remedial backdating in Obergefell as a constitutional
minimum—but it did not.”).
104
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
105
Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at
2601).
103
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As the remainder of this Part makes clear, however, there are a number
of marital benefits that would have accrued to those in same-sex relationships
if not for the unconstitutional denial of their right to wed. Thus, failure to
count the years same-sex couples spent in an informal marriage-like state
would undermine Obergefell’s promise of “liberty and equality under the
Constitution.”106 After discussing several of the marital benefits that fall into
this category, this Part will then look to the disparate approaches states have
taken when confronted with the issue of whether to “backdate” marriages for
same-sex couples.
A. Benefits Conditioned on Length of Marriage
This Article began by discussing Michael Ely’s pursuit of social security
benefits, which is but one of the “constellation of benefits” tied to length of
marriage.107 In that example, the Social Security Administration refused to
recognize Ely as a surviving spouse given that he was unable to satisfy the
Act’s requirement that he was married to the insured for nine months.108
Other federal benefits have similar restrictions. For instance, the statute
governing pension benefits for surviving spouses of federal employees has
the same nine-month requirement.109 Additionally, the federal statute that
deals with pension benefits for surviving spouses of military veterans
withholds eligibility “unless such surviving spouse was married to such
veteran . . . before the expiration of fifteen years after the termination of the
period of service in which the injury or disease causing the death of the
veteran was incurred or aggravated; or . . . for one year or more.”110 Beyond
benefits related to surviving spouses, federal law likewise imposes length of
marriage restrictions in the area of immigration law. For instance, one can
petition to have a spouse classified as an immediate relative only after “the
alien has resided outside the United States for a 2-year period beginning after
the date of the marriage.”111
At the state level, there are additional benefits that are conditioned on
being married for a certain amount of time. In Arkansas, for instance, a
surviving spouse’s ability to take an elective share is conditioned on having
“been married to the decedent continuously for a period in excess of one (1)
year.”112 Similarly, a number of other states calculate the amount of the
106

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
108
And this is but one of the Social Security benefits tied to length of marriage. For an
excellent discussion of others see Nicolas, supra note 17, at 408-12.
109
See 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A) (2012).
110
See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(2), 1304, 1541(f) (2012).
111
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(g) (2012).
112
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-401(a) (2015). “Elective share” refers to “state law
107
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elective share by looking at how long the parties were married.113 A number
of states condition certain divorce protections on the length of the marriage.
For instance, when it comes to the decision of whether to award alimony and
in what amount, some states have statutes requiring courts to consider the
length of the marriage.114 Indeed, in the absence of a statutory directive,
several states have held that there is a rebuttable presumption of permanent
alimony if the marriage was “long-term.”115 Many states also consider the
length of the marriage when determining property distribution.116 A divorce
statute in Washington, for instance, directs that “a court shall . . . make such
disposition of the property and the liabilities of the parties . . . after
considering all relevant factors including . . . [t]he duration of the
marriage.”117
Beyond absolute length of marriage, many marital benefits at the state
level are conditioned on whether the parties were married during the
occurrence of certain events. One of the most notable examples relates to
property distribution. Upon divorce, the majority of states equitably divide a
couple’s marital property between the two parties, but not each spouse’s
separate property, which remains with the spouse who owns it.118
[that] gives surviving spouses the right to make claims against their deceased spouses'
estates, even if the deceased spouses explicitly disinherited them.” Laura A. Rosenbury, Two
Ways to End A Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1245 (2005).
113
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-202 (West).
114
See, e.g., Lyudmila Workman (2011), Alimony Demographics, 20 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 109, 110 (2012) (“Length of marriage is one significant factor in determining
the distribution of alimony awards.”).
115
See id. (discussing a study that found “that women who had been housewives in
marriages lasting 10 years or more were much more likely to be awarded support than those
in marriages of less than five years, and that the likelihood of receiving alimony increased
proportionately to the length of the underlying marriage”); see also Erez Aloni, The Puzzle
of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 317, 341 (2016) (noting that “many
states now restrict permanent alimony to long-term marriages”).
116
See, e.g., Swanson v. Swanson, 921 N.W.2d 666, 670 (N.D. 2019) (“A long-term
marriage generally supports an equal property distribution.”); Impullitti v. Impullitti, 15
N.W.2d 261, 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (“Factors to be considered in the division are the
property's source, contribution towards its acquisition, length of the marriage, and the needs
and earning capacities of the parties.”).
117
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West) (“In fixing the nature and value of the
property, if any, to be assigned, the court . . . shall consider [among other things] the length
of the marriage.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West) (“The court shall divide all property,
except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one party, equitably between the
parties after considering [among other things] [t]he length of the marriage.”).
118
See ANNE LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
713 (2019) (“Most states are ‘marital property’ states, which require the divorce court to
classify the property owned by the spouses at the time of divorce as either marital or separate,
and then authorize the court to divide all marital property.”). Community property states
follow a similar approach, but label the property acquired during marriage as “community
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Determining whether a particular item of property qualifies as marital or
separate typically relates to when that property was acquired—if before
marriage, separate; if during the marriage, marital.119 For an economically
dependent spouse, this distinction can be crucial, especially if the most
valuable items of property are ultimately declared the separate property of
the other spouse.
To illustrate, consider a same-sex couple who entered into a committed
relationship in 2005. The two would have married had they had the right to
do so, but instead were forced to wait until 2015 when Obergefell finally
ushered in marriage equality. The two immediately married but then divorced
three years later. In many states, any property the two had acquired between
2005 and 2015 would be considered separate and, thus, not subject to division
upon divorce. Had the couple been permitted to wed in 2005, however, that
same property would have likely been classified as divisible, marital
property. Similar marital benefits that are conditioned on the parties being
married at certain point in time include the marital privilege, which only
protects communications made between two people who were married at the
time of the communication;120 the ability to bring a claim for loss of
consortium, which requires the claimant to have been married to the injured
party at the time of the injury;121 and the marital presumption, which
presumes the spouse of the mother is the child’s second parent but only if the
two were married when she gave birth.122
property,” a designation that influences the “management and use” of that property not only
when the marriage ends, but during the marriage as well. Id. at 714. A minority of states
follow the “hotchpot” approach, whereby all property is subject to division regardless of
when it was acquired. Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the
Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 836 n.76 (2005) (noting
that only 14 states “permit[] the division of premarital assets”).
119
There are typically exceptions, however, for property acquired during marriage as a
result of inheritance or gift. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-213 (“A spouse's real and
personal property that is owned by that spouse before marriage and that is acquired by that
spouse during the marriage by gift, devise or descent, . . . is the separate property of that
spouse.”) (emphasis added); see also Carla M. Roberts, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright As
Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053, 1059–60 (1991) (“Separate property typically is
anything an individual owned prior to entering a marriage, income received from separate
property, and property received by descent, devise, or gift during the marriage.”).
120
See Steven A. Young, Retroactive Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage for the
Purposes of the Confidential Marital Communications Privilege, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
319, 330 (2016) (“[I]t is critically important that the privilege requires ‘spouses,’ meaning
the two parties must be married at the time the communication was made.”).
121
See infra notes 140-148 and accompanying text.
122
See Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 662 (2014) (“Long before paternity tests were available, in other
words, the marital presumption assumed that married women did not bear children fathered
by men other than their husbands.”); see also infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, one cannot lose sight of the marital benefits tied to the
very fact of marriage and how the availability of those benefits have been
impacted by same-sex relationships that predated marriage equality. For
instance, there are a number of individuals living today who never formalized
their same-sex relationships simply because their partners died before they
were legally permitted to wed. For those survivors, the timing of their
partner’s deaths caused significant legal harm. Consider, for instance, Helen
Thornton and Margery Brown, who were in a committed relationship in
Washington for twenty-seven years.123 The two women met in 1979, and their
relationship lasted until 2006 when Brown died of cancer.124 Given that samesex marriage was not permitted in Washington state until 2012, the two
women were unable to marry.125 Accordingly, when Thornton filed for social
security benefits as a surviving spouse, her application was denied.126
In addition, there are a number of same-sex relationships that the parties
dissolved prior to marriage equality. The potential harm to individuals in
those relationships stems from the fact that, had they been permitted to marry,
those relationships might have been marital and thus could only have been
dissolved in accordance with the protections afforded by the states’ divorce
laws. For example, in 2004, Kimberly Sutton proposed marriage to Charlene
Ramey.127 The Oklahoma couple spent the next eight and a half years living
together and holding themselves out as a committed couple.128 The two even
agreed to become parents.129 Using artificial insemination, Kimberly became
pregnant, and gave birth to a son in 2005.130 Nonetheless, Kimberly
acknowledged Charlene as the child’s other parent.131 In fact, Charlene
served as primary caregiver to the child, who referred to Charlene as
“mom.”132 Likewise, the trio held themselves out to friends and relatives as
123

The details of this case are all taken from the complaint filed on their behalf by
Lambda
Legal.
See
https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/legaldocs/thornton_wa_20180925_complaint.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217, 220 (Okla. 2015) (“Ramey . . . wore a diamond ring
to reflect their mutual commitment.).
128
Id. at 219.
129
Id.
130
Id. Although “[a] friend of the couple agreed to be the donor,” the court noted that
“[t]he donor understood and agreed that Ramey and Sutton would co-parent and raise any
child conceived as their own and that he did not have any obligations.” Id. at n. 4.
131
Id. (“Sutton prepared a baby book for their child identifying both Sutton and Ramey
as parents. Sutton gave a card to Ramey congratulating her on becoming a ‘mother’ to their
son and that she would be a wonderful mom.”).
132
Id. The child would not refer to Kimberly as her mother “until the age of five or six.”
Id. (“ Even today, their child will sometimes refer to Sutton, the biological mom as Kimberly
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a family.133
When the relationship between the two women ultimately ended,
Kimberly argued that Charlene was not entitled to custody or visitation given
that she was not the biological parent, and the two had never married.134 Had
the two wed at any point prior to dissolving their relationship, there would
have been no question that Charlene was a legal parent.135 Charlene did
ultimately prevail, but it was not because the court was willing to consider
the quality of the relationship during a time when marriage was an
impossibility. Instead, the court ruled that, “although the biological mother
enjoys many rights as a parent, it does not include the right to erase a
relationship that she voluntarily created and fostered with their child.”136
Thus, for the LGBTQ Americans who were lucky enough to have lived
to see marriage equality become the law of the land, they still face
discrimination when it comes to receiving “the same terms and conditions as
opposite-sex couples.”137 Specifically, for individuals today who were in
same-sex relationships that would have been marriages had the law not
prevented them from formalizing their unions, they are being denied a
number of protective benefits. Although these benefits are likewise denied
opposite-sex couples whose relationships ended before they could marry or
who spent years cohabitating prior to a formal marriage, there is a key
difference: for same-sex couples, marriage was a legal impossibility.
B. State Responses
The concept of formal marriage equality is still relatively new and, as
such, there are a number of questions regarding the reach of Obergefell with
which the law must still grapple.138 Justice Kennedy’s equal protection
and not as ‘mom.’”).
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 10, § 7700-204 (West) (stating that “[a] man is presumed to
be the father of a child if . . . [h]e and the mother of the child are married to each other and
the child is born during the marriage”). Although the statute is written in gendered terms, the
Supreme Court has ruled that a state cannot extend the marital presumption to opposite-sex
marriages without also extending it to same-sex marriages. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.Ct.
2075 (2017).
136
Id. at 221. In ruling for Ramey, however, the court did note that “[t]he couple's failure
to marry cannot now be used as a means to further deprive the nonbiological parent, who has
acted in loco parentis, of a best interests of the child hearing.”
137
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
138
Craig Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope: Toward A Theory of Interpreting
Precedents, 94 N.C. L. REV. 379, 467 (2016) (noting that Obergefell “resolved doctrinal
debates over same-sex marriage, but . . . raised unanswered questions concerning LGBT
discrimination, polygamy, and other forms of constitutional liberty”).
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analysis, for instance, did little to illuminate the standard of review that
applies to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.139 What does
seem clear, however, in the wake of both Obergefell and Pavan is that
whatever marital benefits a state extends to opposite-sex couples, it must
likewise extend to same-sex couples. The question arises, however, as to how
states are to apportion marital benefits to same-sex couples who were
prohibited by law from marrying. Since Obergefell the issue has arisen in a
variety of contexts, and not surprisingly, the states have taken a number of
different approaches.
Even before Obergefell, the Supreme Court of Connecticut became one
of the earliest courts to rule that same-sex couples are entitled to marital
benefits if—but for the prohibition against same-sex marriage—they would
have wed at an earlier date. In Mueller v. Tepler, Margaret Mueller and
Charlotte Stacey were in a longtime relationship that began in 1985.140 In
2001, Margaret’s physician diagnosed and subsequently treated her for
ovarian cancer when, in fact, she was suffering from cancer of the
appendix.141 Left untreated, Margaret’s cancer progressed to the point where
surgery was no longer an option, and she died in 2009.142 In 2006, however,
she brought a medical malpractice claim, which included a claim by Charlotte
for loss of consortium.143 The defendants moved to strike Charlotte’s claim
on the basis that, at the time of the alleged negligence, she and Margaret were
not married as is required by the state’s law regarding loss of consortium
claims.144 Although the two did enter into a civil union in 2005 pursuant to
Connecticut law, the plaintiffs had alleged that the medical malpractice
occurred before that date.145
Nonetheless, the court ruled that the requirement that the plaintiff must
have been married to the injured party at the time of the injury “only has
logical force ... if the couple was capable of entering into a ‘formal marriage
139

See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Reconstruction, 10 UC IRVINE L. REV. 937, 985 (2020)
(“[T]he Court appeared to apply something more rigorous than traditional rational basis
review [but] never articulated a standard of review.”).
140
Mueller v. Tepler, 95 A.3d 1011, 1015 (Conn. 2014).
141
Id. (noting that the doctor “either failed to review the pathology report or
misinterpreted its findings”).
142
Id. (“Although the error was discovered in April 2005, Mueller's cancer had
progressed to a stage where some of the tumors no longer could be removed surgically.”).
143
Id.
144
Id.; see also Gurliacci v. Mayer, 590 A.2d 914, 931–32 (Conn. 1991) (“[V]irtually
all of the jurisdictions that have considered the question take the position that ‘[a]n action
for loss of consortium cannot be maintained unless the plaintiff was married to the injured
person at the time of the actionable conduct.’”) (quoting Briggs v. Butterfield, 479 N.Y.S.2d
758 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)).
145
Id. The court did note, however, that the two were not permitted to enter into the civil
union until a year after the doctor had stopped treating Margaret. Id. at n. 4.
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relation’ prior to the injury.”146 Because that option was not available to
Margaret and Charlotte, the court expanded the ability to bring a loss of
consortium claim “to members of couples who were not married when the
tortious conduct occurred, but who would have been married if the marriage
had not been barred by state law.”147 In light of that expansion, the court
remanded the case to determine whether the two women’s relationship met
that test.148
The following year, an Oregon court would adopt a similar test. There,
Karah and Lorrena Madrone held a commitment ceremony in 2005.149 Two
years later, the two women decided to have a child by artificial insemination,
and Lorrena agreed to carry the child.150 Afterwards, the two women both
changed their last names to Madrone and registered as domestic partners
pursuant to Oregon law.151 The relationship between the two women
“deteriorated,” and in 2012 Karah filed for a dissolution of the domestic
partnership.152 She also sought a declaration that she was the legal parent of
the child born to Lorrena.153 Karah did so by relying on an Oregon statute
that provided that a husband of a woman who conceives by artificial
insemination is presumed (assuming he consented to the insemination) to be
the legal father.154 Although Oregon courts had previously extended the
statute’s protections to same-sex partners,155 Lorrena objected on the basis
that the two women did not enter into a domestic partnership until after the
child was born.156 The court rejected her argument, however, and held that
“choice is the key to determining whether [the Oregon statute] applies to a
particular same-sex couple”:157
146

Id. at 1017 (quoting plaintiff’s objection to defendants’ motion to strike).
Id. at 1023.
148
Id. at 1030-31.
149
In re Madrone, 350 P.3d 495, 497 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
150
Id.
151
Id. at 498 n. 1.
152
Id. at 496.
153
Id. (“Petitioner alleged that, at the time of R's conception and birth, she was
respondent's “domestic and life partner,” that she and respondent had planned the pregnancy
with the intent to raise the child together, and that she had consented to the artificial
insemination procedure.”).
154
Id. at 498 (the statute provides the same rights to the mother’s husband “as if the child
had been naturally and legitimately conceived by the mother and the mother's husband.”
(quoting OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.243 (West)).
155
See Shineovich & Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (“extend[ing] the
statute so that it applies when the same-sex partner of the biological mother consented to the
artificial insemination.”).
156
In re Madrone, 350 P.3d at 499 (quoting Lorrena’s argument that “the protections
afforded [by the Oregon statute] apply to domestic partners, not simply people in a
relationship”).
157
Id. at 501.
147
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Given that same-sex couples were until recently prohibited
from choosing to be married, the test for whether a same-sex
couple is similarly situated to the married opposite-sex
couple contemplated in [the statute] cannot be whether the
same-sex couple chose to be married or not. Rather, the
salient question is whether the same-sex partners would have
chosen to marry before the child's birth had they been
permitted to.158
For those reasons, the case was remanded to determine whether the “couple
would have married had that choice been available.”159
The Connecticut and Oregon cases both arose in states where same-sex
couples, even before they obtained the right to marry, had the option of
entering into a civil union or domestic partnership. Since Obergefell, many
of those states have adopted legislation concerning how time spent in these
“alternative species of quasi-marriage”160 will count toward the length of the
marriage. Specifically, as Peter Nicolas explains, seven states that permitted
same-sex couples to enter into domestic partnerships or civil unions preObergefell have since “created a seamless mechanism for converting civil
unions or domestic partnerships to marriages.”161 Of those, about half have
legislated that the marriage began on the date the relationship was converted
to a formal marriage while the remainder set the date as when the couple first
entered into the domestic partnership or civil union.162 Although the latter
approach allows the same-sex couple to count more of their actual
relationship toward the subsequent marriage, it still only applies to those
portions that came after the couple entered into the domestic partnership or
civil union—legal options that may not have been available until after the
couple had already been in a relationship for many years.
Nonetheless, such an approach is still superior to that being taken in
states that failed to even offer civil unions or domestic partnerships. In the
few cases that have arisen in those states, courts have simply refused to grant
marital benefits to same-sex couples whose relationships spanned time
158

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 502, 503.
160
Andersen v. King Cty., 2004 WL 1738447, at *12 (Wash. Super. Aug. 4, 2004).
161
Nicolas, supra note 17, at 405.
162
Id. at 405-06; Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.100 (West) (“[T]he date of
the original state registered domestic partnership is the legal date of the marriage.”) with 15
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3.1-13 (West) (“For purposes of determining the legal rights and
responsibilities involving [married] individuals who previously entered into a civil union in
this state, . . . the date of the recording of the marriage certificate shall be the operative date
by which legal rights and responsibilities are determined.”).
159
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periods in which they were prohibited from marrying. Consider, for instance,
a Michigan case involving two women, Deanna and Johanna Mabry, who
were in a relationship that began in 1995 and lasted until 2010.163 During that
time, the two bought a house together, participated in a commitment
ceremony, and Johanna even took Deanna’s last name.164 Most relevant to
the subsequent litigation, however, was the fact that the relationship produced
three children.165 Johanna was the biological mother, having conceived using
an anonymous donor.166 Nonetheless, Deanna’s role in the children’s lives
was “significant” in that she “provided [them] with health insurance, she was
the sole financial provider for the family, and she provided care and guidance
to the children.”167 In fact, Johanna’s will provided that, “in the event of her
death, [Deanna] would be the children's legal guardian and conservator.”168
However, when the parties ended their relationship and Deanna
petitioned for custody, the Michigan court ruled that she lacked standing
because she was never formally married to the children’s mother.169 Unlike
the courts in Connecticut and Oregon,170 the court refused to even consider
whether the couple would have married had they been permitted to do so. A
year earlier, a court in Florida, on very similar facts, reached the same
conclusion.171 Thus, in comparison to states like Connecticut and Oregon,
states that never adopted alternatives to marriage currently appear to be more
hostile to backdating claims by those in same-sex relationships.
There is, however, one exception and that is the handful of states that
permit informal or common-law marriage. A survey of decisions from those
states reveals that some have been willing to offer relief by finding that the
couple had effectuated a common-law marriage. To illustrate, consider the
South Carolina case of Debra Parks, who ended a forty-year relationship with
her partner in 2017.172 During this time, the two had bought a house and
163

Mabry v. Mabry, 882 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Mich. 2016) (McCormack, J., dissenting).
Id. (Additionally, the two took additional steps, including “filing a declaration of
domestic partnership, . . . entering a formal domestic-partnership agreement, . . . and entering
into a marriage covenant in the form of a ketubah”).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. (noting that all three children “were biological children of the defendant but took
the plaintiff's last name and were parented by both the defendant and the plaintiff”).
168
Id.
169
Id. at 541 (“The order held that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring a custody
action pursuant to the equitable-parent doctrine because that doctrine is only available to a
parent who was married.”).
170
See supra notes 140-159 and accompanying text.
171
See Willis v. Mobley, 171 So. 3d 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (unpublished
disposition).
172
See Andrew Dys, Same-Sex Legal Groundbreaker: Judge Says Rock Hill Couple
Married
In
S.C.
For
Decades,
THE HERALD
(March
19,
2017),
164
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“other property together, had joint bank accounts, used each other on tax
documents, and lived together until 2016.”173 The couple resided in South
Carolina, which did not permit same-sex marriage until 2014.174 South
Carolina does, however, recognize common-law marriage.175 When Parks
sued to have her relationship declared a common-law marriage, the judge
agreed.176 In essence, the court ruled that not only had the two entered into a
common-law marriage, but that it had commenced when Parks divorced her
husband in 1987—twenty-seven years before South Carolina would begin
allowing same-sex marriage.177 Other common law marriage states have
reached similar results when dealing with individuals whose same-sex
partners died before they were able to legally wed.178
Because very few states permit common law marriage, however, the vast
majority of states have had to fashion new tests for dealing with those in
same-sex relationships that predated marriage equality. And, as detailed
earlier, those states have done so with varying approaches and with divergent
opinions as to what true marriage equality entails. That itself is problematic,
in light of the fact that the right to marry is a constitutionally protected
right.179 As such there necessarily must exist some standards to which all
states must adhere. Of course, family law is largely within the primary
province of the states, and as such, it would be unreasonable to expect all
states to have an identical response to this issue.180 In fact, as Professor
Charles Rhodes as pointed out, “family law courts, as a rule, traditionally
https://www.heraldonline.com/news/local/article139540723.html#storylink=cpy
173
Id. According to Park, “We were a family, even when society didn’t accept it.” Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. According to the Judge, “Quoting William Shakespeare, ‘A rose by any other
name would smell as sweet. . . . The law established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell
. . . should be applied retroactively in South Carolina.” Id.
177
Id.
178
See Nicolas, supra note 17, at 416-18 (collecting and discussing cases); Steven A.
Young, Retroactive Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage for the Purposes of the Confidential
Marital Communications Privilege, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 338-43 (2016) (same).
179
See Michael J. Higdon, Polygamous Marriage, Monogamous Divorce, 67 DUKE L.J.
79, 96 (2017) (“[T]he Court has declared that, under the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to marry is a fundamental right.”).
180
See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Reason, Tradition, and Family Law: A Comment on Social
Constructionism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1524 (1993) (“[A] cardinal tenet of United States
jurisprudence is that family law is primarily the province of individual states-a principle that
explicitly invites the codification of diverse particular judgments about how family life
should be arranged.”); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Unintended Consequences: Why Congress
Should Tread Lightly When Entering the Field of Family Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 397,
406 (2008) (“Leaving family law to the states, however, allows diversity to exist within the
United States, and individuals whose values differ from those of the majority in one location
have the alternative of emigrating to another, more compatible, community.”).
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have broad judicial discretion in adjudicating disputes and fashioning just
outcomes.”181 Nonetheless, because “federal constitutional rights are
understood to extend equally across the land,”182 there are limits to how
divergent states can be when it comes to resolving the issue of backdating
same-sex marriage.183
Thus, a more consistent remedy is necessary if states are to remedy the
harms that many individuals from same-sex relationships continue to
experience as a result of the unconstitutional laws that had long prevented
them from marrying.
III. THE LAW OF INFORMAL FAMILY CREATION
States that refuse to consider the pre-equality portion of a same-sex
couple’s relationship are producing two separate, but related harms. First,
they are short-changing individuals in same-sex marriages who seek marital
benefits tied to length of marriage.184 Second, those states completely
denying all marital benefits to those who were in same-sex relationships that
ended (either through dissolution or divorce) prior to the time marriage
became a legal option. Both harms run counter to the Court’s holding in
Obergefell, and thus a new remedy is required.
When it comes to formulating an appropriate remedy, however, it is
important to first recognize that states are not operating on a blank slate when
it comes to awarding family-like benefits to individuals who lack formal
family relationships. Instead, the states already possess a number of equitable
doctrines that operate in a variety of different contexts to do just that—
doctrines that can greatly assist the courts in crafting a new remedy to protect
same-sex couples whose relationships pre-dated marriage equality. These
existing remedies are operate against a backdrop where, despite the robust
legal protections that exist for American families, there is little consensus on
the precise legal definition of “family.”185 When people talk of “starting a
181

Rhodes, supra note 17, at 432.
Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and
the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 169 (2009).
183
Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483, 1490 (2018)
(“[A]ll constitutional rights, it must necessarily possess some core limits that bind the
states.”).
184
See Nicolas, supra note 17, at 397 (“[M]any same-sex relationships appear artificially
short in endurance when measured solely by reference to the couple’s civil marriage date.”
185
Kirsten Korn, The Struggle for the Child: Preserving the Family in Adoption Disputes
Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1291 (1994)
(“Although the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution protects various aspects of the
family, as well as the parent-child relationship, determining what constitutes a “family” and
who may be considered “parents” for purposes of such protection has proved difficult.”).
182
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family,” one typically imagines marriage and the eventual addition of
children, either through birth or adoption. The reality, however, is much more
complicated, and over the years that complexity has only grown.186 Couples
may get married, or they may not. Perhaps the couple thought they were
married when, in reality, the marriage was void for some reason. The two
may have children together, or they may not. Perhaps they end up raising
children who only have a biological relationship with one of them. Maybe
the nonbiological parent adopts the new children, but perhaps not. Maybe
they agree to take in a child from a friend or relative and, despite an intent to
do so, never get around to formally adopting the child.
Family law is no stranger to dealing with any of these scenarios,
consistently drawing upon its “built-in flexibility to adapt to changing
times.”187 And, indeed, over the years states have developed a number of
doctrines that permit courts to extend familial rights even to those who failed
to formally create legal family relationships. What follows is a brief survey
of five different examples that courts have relied upon in order to fashion a
new remedy for same-sex couples whose “marriages” pre-dated the legal
recognition of their right to form such unions. In reviewing these existing
doctrines, it is important to note how the courts resort to them primarily for
reasons of equity, focusing on the need to protect parties from the harms they
would otherwise suffer were the court to rigidly insist on form over
substance.
A. Informal Marriage
Common law marriage provides likely the most obvious example of
legally recognized family relationships that arise through informal means.
Also referred to as informal marriage, common law marriage “is formed by
the conduct, statements, and intent of the parties to the marriage without
official involvement or formalities.”188 However, unlike the other equitable
remedies discussed below where parties can claim some of the rights
associated with either marriage or parentage, common law marriage results
in a legal union that carries with it the same rights and obligations of formal
186

Michael J. Higdon, The Quasi-Parent Conundrum, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 941, 948-49
(2019) (discussing various social changes that have led to American families being “more
heterogeneous than ever before”).
187
Supriya Kakkar, Unauthorized Embryo Transfer at the University of California,
Irvine Center for Reproductive Health, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1031 (1997); see
also Bradley G. Silverman, Federal Questions and the Domestic-Relations Exception, 125
YALE L.J. 1364, 1392 (2016) (“Crafting a workable system of family law requires calibrating
a complex level of benefits to which state law entitles those who occupy different familial
roles.”) (internal quotes omitted).
188
Rhodes, supra note 17, at 437.
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marriage.189 As Judge Posner explained in a 2000 opinion from the Seventh
Circuit: “The purpose of common law marriage is not to create a second-class
sort of marriage, but rather to repair unintended deficiencies in the ceremony.
[and thus] a common law spouse has the same rights as any other spouse.”190
Despite the implications of its name, common law marriage is largely an
American invention.191 An 1809 case out of New York is commonly credited
as the first to recognize the legality of informal marriage,192 and the facts of
that case help explain why states would embrace having this alternative path
to legal marriage. In Fenton v. Reed, Mrs. William Reed claimed a widow’s
pension from the Provident Society after the 1806 death of her husband.193
The Society refused, however, on the basis that her marriage to William was
invalid.194 After all, William was not her first husband. Instead, she had
previously wed a man named John Guest, who in 1785 left her and traveled
to “foreign parts.”195 When he did not return, she married Reed in 1792,
believing her first husband to be dead.196 Guest was not dead, however, and
returned to New York later that year, where he lived until his death in 1800197.
During this time, Guest “did not object to the connection between the
plaintiff and Reed, and said that he had no claim upon her, and never
interfered to disturb the harmony between them.”198 Nonetheless, given that
she never divorced her first husband and he was still living when she married
Reed, the Society argued that her second marriage was void.199 Had she
attempted to marry Reed again following Guest’s death, the marriage would

189

See Peter Nicolas, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV. 931, 934
(2011) (“When entered into, a common law marriage provides the same rights, privileges,
and responsibilities as a ceremonial marriage, and is as durable as a ceremonial marriage,
requiring divorce proceedings to terminate the relationship.”).
190
Barron v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 984, 985 (7th Cir. 2000).
191
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN Law 202-04 (2d ed. 1985)
(“Probably there was no such institution [as common law marriage] in England.”); Adair
Dyer, The Internationalization of Family Law, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 626 (1997)
(noting that “the informal contractual status known as ‘common law marriage’ may have
been an American innovation”).
192
See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Same-Sex Marriage: The Cultural Wars and the
Lessons of Legal History, 38 FAM. L.Q. 427, 434 n. 45 (2004) (“Informal marriage appears
to have first been recognized by the New York court in Fenton v. Reed.”).
193
Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52 (1809).
194
Id. at 52-53.
195
Id. at 52.
196
Id. (“[I]t was reported, and generally believed, that [Guest] had died in foreign
parts.”).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 53. In part, the court agreed: “The marriage of the plaintiff below with William
Reed during the life-time of her husband John Guest, was null and void.” Id.
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have been valid, but she did not “re-solemnize” her relationship with Reed.200
The court, however, disagreed and held that it was not necessary to prove that
the marriage had been solemnized. Instead, “[a] marriage may be proved . . .
from cohabitation, reputation, acknowledgment of the parties, reception in
the family, and other circumstances from which a marriage may be
inferred.”201 Turning to the facts of the case, the court found that
circumstances were such that, although her attempt to formally marry Reed
was invalid given her existing marriage to Guest, she subsequently
effectuated a common law marriage with Reed after her first husband died:
“The parties cohabited together as husband and wife, and under the reputation
and understanding that they were such, from 1800 [when Guest died] to 1806,
when Reed died.”202
Other states would soon embrace the doctrine and its ability to protect the
interests of those in economically dependent relationships.203 By the end of
the nineteenth century, common law marriage would become the law in a
majority of the states.204 It proved popular for a number of reasons, including
how well-suited it was to frontier conditions where finding someone to
perform a formal wedding might be difficult,205 how it provided individuals
with greater autonomy and freedom from the state;206 how it helped
legitimize children;207 and how it provided for unsuspecting women who

200

Id. at 52 (“[N]o solemnization of marriage was proved to have taken place between
the plaintiff and Reed, subsequent to the death of Guest.”).
201
Id. at 54 (“No formal solemnization of marriage was requisite. A contract of marriage
made per verba de presenti amounts to an actual marriage.”).
202
Id.
203
See Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and
Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
45, 65–66 (1981) (“The idea that marriage could be validated by the mere consent of the
spouses gained strength from cases that . . . recognized informal or ‘common law’ marriages
and appeared in community property as well as in common law states.”).
204
See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 715 (1996) (noting that the doctrine was recognized by “a
majority of the states in 1920 and even more in the nineteenth century”).
205
See Perry Dane, A Holy Secular Institution, 58 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1147 (2009)
(identifying as one of the reasons states embraced common law marriage, “the difficulty of
requiring resort to either a governmental or religious official in a dispersed frontier society”).
206
See Nicolas, supra note 189, at 939 (“One oft-cited rationale [for common law
marriage] is a libertarian concept of autonomy and independence, the idea that marriage is a
natural right and that individuals should be free to enter into marriages without the need to
invoke the power of the state.”).
207
See Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal
Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2166 (2014) (“Judges and
lawyers acknowledged that a primary purpose of common law marriage was to ensure that
children born of such a union were legitimate.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655687

32

(In)Formal Marriage Equality

[19-Jul-20

relied to their detriment on the existence of a valid marriage.208 In 1877, the
Supreme Court seemingly gave its blessing to the idea of marriage by
informal means when it held that, unless a state explicitly required formal
marriage, marriage laws that required a license and a ceremony were “merely
directory.”209
As the United States entered into the twentieth century, however,
common law marriage would begin to lose favor rather rapidly.210 The
various reasons for that decline have been well-documented elsewhere and
thus do not require expansive discussion here, but in the words of Professor
Cynthia Grant Bowman, it essentially boiled down to “urbanization,
industrialization, concerns about fraud, the ideology of the family, racism,
and eugenics.”211 Currently, only eight states and the District of Columbia
allow their citizens to effectuate marriage through informal means.212 Even
those states, however, require heightened proof in order to establish a
common law marriage,213 the most central being that the two parties have “an
express mutual agreement, which must be in words of the present tense.”214
Recognizing that, in the absence of a formal ceremony, it might be difficult
to prove the existence of such an agreement, many states permit parties to
prove the agreement by relying on evidence of cohabitation and having a
reputation in the community as being marriedt.215 Other states explicitly
208

See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 957, 964 (2000) (“As common law marriage triumphed as a dominant legal
rule over the course of the nineteenth century, it took as its premise that the law should protect
innocent women from the whims and contrivances of irresponsible or rakish men.”).
209
Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78 (1877).
210
See Ashley Hedgecock, Untying the Knot: The Propriety of South Carolina's
Recognition of Common Law Marriage, 58 S.C. L. REV. 555, 562 (2007) (“Beginning in the
late nineteenth century, many jurisdictions that previously recognized common law marriage
began to abolish the doctrine.”).
211
Bowman, supra note 204, at 732.
212
See COMMON LAW MARRIAGE BY STATE, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(March 11, 2020), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/common-lawmarriage.aspx (listing states). However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina recently ruled
that, going forward, it will no longer allow its citizens to enter into common law marriages
although it will continue to those that couples effectuated in the past. See Stone v. Thompson,
833 S.E.2d 266 (S.C. 2019).
213
See Michael J. Higdon, Fatherhood by Conscription: Nonconsensual Insemination
and the Duty of Child Support, 46 GA. L. REV. 407, 453 (2012) (“[C]ourts in those states
recognizing common law marriage have noted that such claims are a ‘fruitful source of
perjury and fraud’ and, as such, have placed a heavy burden on the party claiming common
law marriage.”) (quoting Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Pa. 1998)).
214
Cerovic v. Stojkov, 134 A.3d 766, 777 (D.C. 2016).
215
See Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of A
Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1842–43 (1987) (“Although the doctrine of common
law marriage purportedly depends on the existence of an agreement to be married, normally
an agreement is inferred by courts when a couple engages in cohabitation and acquires a
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require the parties to prove cohabitation and reputation along with the
existence of the agreement to enter into a common law marriage.216 States
also require that the parties had the capacity to wed one another.217
Although most states do not permit people within the state to effectuate a
common law marriage, under full-faith and credit, all will recognize a
common-law marriage validly effectuated in a state to does permit such
unions.218 States do so pursuant to the lex loci rule by which “courts will give
effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a
matter of obligation but out of deference and respect.”219 Thus, even states
that do not permit common law marriage can nonetheless use that doctrine to
extend family law protections to citizens who spent time in a state that does
permit informal marriage. Many states have done just that, often by liberally
construing the common law marriage requirements of a sister state.220 In
reviewing such cases, it is clear that the court did so in order to protect
economically dependent “spouses” from the harms that would result from a
finding that there was never a valid marriage.
The classic example of a court doing just that is Renshaw v. Heckler, a
1986 case out of the Second Circuit.221 There, Edith Renshaw claimed to be
the common-law wife of Albert Renshaw for purposes of securing Social
Security benefits following Albert’s death.222 The couple were never formally

reputation as husband and wife.”).
216
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21,
74 n.132 (1994) (“Most jurisdictions also require cohabitation, or actually and openly living
together as husband and wife.... Some jurisdictions further require that the parties hold
themselves out to the world as husband and wife, and acquire a reputation as a married
couple.”).
217
See Strasser, supra note 17, at 414 (“A couple barred by law from celebrating a
ceremonial marriage will also be barred from contracting a common law marriage.”). In
terms of how that term is defined, Peter Nicolas explains that capacity “is interpreted to refer
to minimum age and mental capacity [but also] encompasses any potential legal impediment
to marrying, such as whether the parties are already married to other people, whether the
marriage would be incestuous, or whether the parties to the relationship are of the same sex.”
Nicolas, supra note 17, at 418 n.136.
218
See Lisa Milot, Restitching the American Marital Quilt: Untangling Marriage from
the Nuclear Family, 87 VA. L. REV. 701, 707–08 (2001) (“[B]ecause of the full faith *708
and credit afforded a valid marriage in one state by other states, though, all states recognize
the legal legitimacy of a common-law marriage contracted in another jurisdiction.”).
219
Port v. Cowan, 426 Md. 435, 444, 44 A.3d 970, 975 (2012).
220
See Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 735, 759 (2011) (“[C]ourts in states that do not recognize common law marriage
sometimes stretch doctrine to recognize common law marriages of couples who reside
there.”).
221
Renshaw v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986)
222
Id. at 51.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655687

34

(In)Formal Marriage Equality

[19-Jul-20

married but had been living as though they were for over twenty years.223
They exchanged rings, celebrated their anniversary every year, and
represented themselves as married to those around them.224 The two even had
a child together.225 The problem, however, was that they resided in New
York, which no longer permitted common law marriage. Nonetheless, the
court found that the two had effectuated a common law marriage.
It did so by relying on the fact that, for seven years in a row, the two took
an annual road trip to Virginia and North Carolina226—two states that
likewise do not permit common law marriage. Pennsylvania, however, did
allow informal marriage and that fact proved relevant because the couple
spent a single night in Pennsylvania during each of these trips.227 Like other
common law states, Pennsylvania looked to cohabitation and reputation when
determining whether a couple had effectuated a common law marriage.228
The Renshaws had clearly satisfied those elements over the course of their
long-term relationship, but the question was whether they had done so while
in Pennsylvania.229 Despite noting that Pennsylvania places a “heavy
burden”230 on those seeking to establish a common law marriage, the court
nonetheless found that Edith had met that standard:
The Renshaws' stays in Pennsylvania were admittedly short;
but they cohabitated during the entire time that they were
there. While the evidence of reputation is not extensive, they
held themselves out as husband and wife to every individual
they knew that they saw in Pennsylvania—his mother, her
brother, and their daughter. Moreover, Mrs. Renshaw
testified that when Mr. Renshaw made reservations over the
phone, he indicated on at least one occasion that the
223

Id.
Id. Additionally, she took his last name and “the couple filed joint tax returns as
husband and wife, and Mr. Renshaw listed Mrs. Renshaw as his wife and beneficiary on his
life insurance policy.” Id.
225
Id.
226
Id. at 51-52.
227
Id. at 52.
228
Id. (“Generally, a common-law marriage may be created by uttering words in the
present tense with the intent to establish a marital relationship, but where no such utterance
is proved, Pennsylvania law also permits a finding of marriage based on reputation and
cohabitation when established by satisfactory proof.”) (citing In re Estate of Wagner, 159
A.2d 495, 498 (Pa. 1960). (internal cites omitted).
229
Id. It was on this basis that the lower court had ruled against Ms. Renshaw finding
that “at best only 16 days out of Mr. Renshaw's lifetime were spent in Pennsylvania [and]
the overwhelming bulk of the supporting evidence rests on actions taken outside of
Pennsylvania in non-common law states.” Id.
230
Id. at 52.
224
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reservations were for himself, his wife, and their daughter.231
Although the court stated that, “in different circumstances, such facts alone
might not prove sufficient,”232 it nonetheless held that “the Renshaws'
conduct while in Pennsylvania and elsewhere is similarly sufficient to . . .
conclude that the Renshaws entered into a valid common-law marriage under
Pennsylvania law.”233
Renshaw is but one example where a court has held that a valid common
law marriage arose after only a few days in a common law marriage state.234
Although the reasoning in these cases appears to be a bit of a stretch,235 the
states are clearly motivated to protect the economic interests of vulnerable
citizens.236
B. Invalid Marriage
Whereas common law marriage allows parties to effectuate a marriage
through informal means, other doctrines in the law allow a party to collect
marital benefits from a formal marriage that was nonetheless invalid.
Collectively, these doctrines are often referred to as the marriage validation
principle, which courts use to try and find a valid marriage even in the face
of facts that cast enormous doubt on that conclusion.237 The courts take this
approach in light of the harms that could befall an economically dependent
“spouse” who ultimately discovers that her marriage is invalid, thus depriving
her of the benefits and protections to which she thought she was entitled.238
231

Id. at 53.
Id.
233
Id. at 54.
234
See, e.g., Blaw-Knox Constr. Equip. Co. v. Morris, 596 A.2d 679 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991) (holding that Maryland couple effectuated a common law marriage after
spending two nights at a Pennsylvania hotel to attend a funeral); In Re Claim of Coney v.
R.S.R. Corp., 563 N.Y.S.2d 211 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that couple effectuated a common
law marriage after spending three days traveling through Georgia).
235
See Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 735, 759 (2011) (noting that “courts in states that do not recognize common law
marriage sometimes stretch doctrine to recognize common law marriages of couples who
reside there”).
236
See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form:
Towards A Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419,
453 (2013) (pointing out that, because “traditional common law marriage is not likely to
make a modern comeback. . . . alternative constructs and regulations are used to protect
vulnerable parties in long-term cohabitant relationships”).
237
See ESTIN, supra note 118, at 98 (“[T]he marriage validation principle . . . seeks to
uphold marriages whenever possible.”).
238
See Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law
Institute's "Domestic Partners" Proposal, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1189, 1198 (2001) (“The
232
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Two notable examples of ways in which courts attempt to validate
questionable marriages are the doctrines of marriage by estoppel and putative
marriage.
Marriage by estoppel prohibits a party from using an invalid divorce in
order to void a subsequent marriage. However, the doctine “is unlike classic
equitable estoppel in that it does not focus solely on whether one party has
made a misrepresentation on which the other has reasonably relied.”239
Instead, “[t]he focus is broader and requires a consideration of all of the
circumstances surrounding not only the procurement of the divorce, but also
the conduct of the parties thereafter and the effect of a declaration of the
invalidity of the divorce on others.”240 As such, “[i]t is sufficient, in many
cases, that a court find only that it would be unfair to let a party take
advantage of the legal invalidity of a divorce decree and the invalidity of the
subsequent marriage.”241
Consider the case of Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, where Pennsylvania
resident Beverly Lowenschuss divorced her first husband in 1964 after
traveling to Alabama.242 However, because she failed to establish residency
in Alabama, her divorce was invalid.243 Not realizing her failure, Beverly
returned to Pennsylvania, where she met and married Fred Lowenschuss.244
The couple eventually had four children together.245 Although Fred testified
that he learned of Beverly's defective divorce in 1974, he nonetheless
remained in the relationship as though nothing had changed.246 In 1981,
Beverly filed for divorce.247 In response, Fred argued that, because she never
legally divorced her first husband, he and Beverly were never legally
married.248 The court, however, held that Fred was estopped from raising the
goal of protecting the financial interests or financial equity of individuals who enter into such
relationships is similar to the policy underlying common law marriage, putative spouse, and
equitable doctrines.”).
239
Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
240
Id.
241
JOHN DE WITT GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER & ROBIN FRETWELL WILSON,
UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 39 (2013)
242
Id. at 378. Around this time, Alabama was a popular destination for those seeking a
relatively easy and quick divorce. See generally, Migratory Divorce: The Alabama
Experience, 75 HARV. L. REV. 568, 569 (1962)
243
Id. (“Wife spent at most two days in Alabama and does not dispute the fact that she
has never been a bona fide resident of Alabama.”).
244
Fred was an attorney and he “knew that wife was divorced, but denies knowing any
of the details concerning how the divorce was procured.” 579 A.2d at 534.
245
Id. at 535.
246
He learned of the divorce that year after he commenced a divorce action, which he
subsequently withdrew. Id.
247
Id. at 377.
248
Id.
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circumstances of Beverly's previous divorce.
Even though Fred was not a party to her prior divorce proceedings, the
court ruled that, in light of his conduct, it would be inequitable for him to
raise that defense at this late date.249 Both parties “relied in good faith on the
Alabama divorce in marrying each other in 1965 and continued to rely on that
divorce at minimum until 1974 . . . . Husband conducted himself as a married
man for nine years before 1974 and after 1974 he continued to live as he had
before.”250 Ultimately, the court found that:
[n]o social purpose will be served by a decision that this
marriage simply does not exist and that wife is still the legal
wife of her first husband and that her four children were born
of an illicit relationship. To hold that husband may now raise
this challenge simply in order to avoid the financial
obligations of his marriage would be grossly inequitable.251
To justify its ruling, the court reiterated the important and protective function
of both marriage and divorce, writing that “a decision which would allow
husband to avoid his marital obligations at this late juncture would be
completely inconsistent with the Commonwealth's contemporary attitude
toward divorce, which is grounded in the application of equitable principles
to achieve economic justice and overall fairness between the parties.”252 As
the court’s opinion makes clear, Fred was estopped largely because he
continued in the marriage long after her learned of the faulty divorce. Had he
sought to invalidate the marriage shortly after learning the truth, he would
have had a stronger argument. However, Beverly might have still had some
recourse as a putative spouse.
Putative marriage is another marriage validation principle, and it allows
courts to extend the civil effects of marriage to one who in good faith entered
into a marriage that was nonetheless invalid. In other words, “[a] putative
marriage . . . is a marriage which is in reality null, but which allows the civil
effects of a valid marriage to flow to the party or parties who contracted it in
good faith.”253 The only requirements parties must meet to avail themselves
of this protection is to have had a ceremonial marriage and to have done so
249

Id. at 549 (“Such a decision would contravene the strongly entrenched policy of this
Commonwealth favoring preservation of the family unit.”).
250
Id. at 548-49.
251
Id. at 549. (“Therefore, we hold that principles of estoppel based on well-established
social policies favoring preservation of the family and economic justice require us to estop
husband from asserting the invalidity of wife's Alabama divorce.”).
252
Id. at 550.
253
See Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1, 6
(1985).
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with a good faith belief that the marriage was valid254—good faith being
defined as “an honest and reasonable belief that there exists no legal
impediment to the marriage.”255
Although putative marriage does not equal legal marriage,256 the doctrine
is nonetheless intended to promote equity and to protect innocent spouses—
for example, individuals who innocently but erroneously believed that they
had obtained a valid divorce prior to remarrying. As one court explained, “a
marriage contracted when one spouse is a party to a previously undissolved
marriage is absolutely null; however, equity demands that innocent persons
not be injured through an innocent relationship.”257 As Professor Christopher
Blakesley points out, the primary motivation behind this doctrine is the desire
to ensure fairness. “The putative marriage doctrine is a device developed to
ameliorate or correct the injustice which would occur if civil effects were not
allowed to flow to a party to a null marriage who believes in good faith that
he or she is validly married.”258
To illustrate, consider the 2004 Nevada case of Williams v. Williams.
There, Richard and Marcie Williams were married in 1973 and lived together
as husband and wife for the next twenty-seven years, at which time Richard
learned that Marcie had never divorced her first husband.259 As a result,
Richard filed an annulment action to have his marriage to Marcie declared
void.260 The Supreme Court of Nevada used this opportunity to adopt the
putative spouse doctrine so as to ensure “[f]airness and equity.”261 The court
ruled that a putative marriage existed. It did so even in the face of Richard’s
argument that Marcie had not entered into their marriage in good faith.
Specifically, Marcie testified “that in 1971, she ran into [her first husband] at
254

See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revision of the Law of Marriage: One Baby Step
Forward, 48 LA. L. REV. 1131, 1150 (1988) (“A prerequisite to the application of the putative
marriage doctrine is contracting the marriage in good faith. The word contracting suggests a
ceremony, which would mean that a marriage that is absolutely null because of no
ceremony130 would never produce civil effects.”).
255
Casey E. Faucon, "Living Separate and Apart": Solving the Problem of Putative
Community Property in Louisiana, 85 TUL. L. REV. 771, 774 n.11 (2011); see also
Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. 797, 804 (La. 1935) (defining good faith as “ignoran[ce] of
the cause which prevents the formation of the marriage or the defects in its celebration which
caused its nullity”).
256
See Lee v. Hunt, 431 F. Supp. 371, 376 (W.D. La. 1977) (“[A] ‘putative spouse’ is
not a spouse and has no personal status. Instead, a ‘putative marriage’ merely creates the
responsibilities that one spouse owes the other because one spouse is guilty of a fault and the
other innocently believes the marriage is genuine.”).
257
Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826, 842 (W.D. La. 1978).
258
Blakesly, supra note 253, at 6.
259
Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1126 (Nev. 2004) (per curiam).
260
Id. (“Marcie answered and counterclaimed for one-half of the property and spousal
support as a putative spouse.”).
261
Id. at 1128.
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a Reno bus station, where he specifically told her that they were divorced and
he was living with another woman.”262 Richard argued that such reliance was
unreasonable given that she had never been served with divorce papers, and,
at the very least, she had a duty to inquire further into the existence of the
“divorce” before marrying again.263 The court, however, rejected Richard's
arguments and held that “[t]he record reflects no reason for Marcie to have
disbelieved him and, thus, no reason to have investigated the truth of his
representations.”264
In ruling as it did, the court took extensive note of Marcie's financial
circumstances:
During the 27 years that the parties believed themselves to
be married, Marcie was a homemaker and a mother. From
1981 to 1999, Marcie was a licensed child-care provider for
six children. During that time, she earned $460 a week. At
trial, Marcie had a certificate of General Educational
Development (G.E.D.) and earned $8.50 an hour at a
retirement home. She was 63 years old and lived with her
daughter because she could not afford to live on her own.265
Implicit in this recitation is the court's awareness of the degree to which
Marcie would be harmed if forced to walk away from a twenty-seven-year
relationship, which she believed was a marriage, with no rights to the
“marital” property. By finding that Marcie was—if not a legal spouse—a
putative spouse, the property acquired during her marriage to Richard was
labeled quasi-community property and divided equally between them.
C. No Marriage
Some states have even used their equitable powers to award marital
benefits to individuals who never married, but merely cohabitated in a
domestic relationship. Historically, the states did very little to protect the
economic interests of those who enter into such relationships.266 And they did
262

Id. at 1127 (“According to Marcie, she discovered she was still married to [Richard]
during the course of the annulment proceedings with Richard.”)
263
Id. at 1129.
264
Id. Relatedly, the court also ruled that “[g]ood faith is presumed. The party asserting
lack of good faith has the burden of proving bad faith.” Id. at 1128.
265
Id. at 1127.
266
See Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite
Sex Couples, 7 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 159 (2005) (“[H]istorically, the cohabiting
relationship was treated as a ‘negative status’ in the law. That is, unmarried cohabitants
experienced significant legal burdens by virtue of their relationship alone.”).
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so purposefully, reasoning that any benefits afforded cohabitating couples
might discourage formal marriage.267 With its landmark decision in Marvin
v. Marvin,268 however, California began to change all that, holding that
express contracts between cohabitants regarding property distribution were
enforceable so long as they were not conditioned “upon the immoral and
illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services.”269 In the absence of an
express agreement, the Supreme Court of California held that recovery was
likewise permitted on the basis of implied contract “or equitable remedies
such as constructive or resulting trusts.”270
By opening the door to legal protections for cohabitants, Marvin was
heavily criticized by those who feared that such an approach would “weaken
marriage as the foundation of our family-based society.”271 However, in the
more than forty years that have elapsed since Marvin was issued, most agree
that overall it had little impact.272 First, a handful of states continue in their
refusal to enforce any cohabitation agreements.273 Second, even among those
that do, Marvin and its progeny only offer limited protections. Specifically,
state law protections for cohabitants typically require that the parties entered
into an agreement regarding their respective rights.274 While some states
permit implied agreements, others require that they be express.275 Some states
267

See Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77
U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 722 (2006) (noting the concern that providing “legal equivalence
between marriage and cohabitation will devalue and discourage marriage”).
268
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal.1976) (en banc).
269
Id. at 112.
270
Id. at 110.
271
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207, 1211 (Ill. 1979) (holding that cohabitation
agreements “are unenforceable for the reason that they contravene the public policy [of the
state] disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried
cohabitants”).
272
As Deborah Rhode has pointed out, “what little empirical evidence is available
suggests that cohabitation generally is not the result of a conscious choice. Rather,
individuals tend to drift into such relationships without focusing on the future or its legal
implications.” DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW 138 (2009).
273
Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in Shaping Family
Formations and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1039 (2015) (“[E]ven today, Illinois,
Georgia, and Louisiana still do not recognize cohabitation contracts between either oppositesex or same-sex couples.”).
274
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 262 (2004) (describing the “contract-based”
approach as the “default framework”).
275
See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (N.Y. 1980) (“The notion of an
implied contract between an unmarried couple living together is, thus, contrary to both New
York decisional law and the implication arising from our Legislature's abolition of commonlaw marriage.”).
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even insist that the agreements be in writing.276 Regardless, by conditioning
legal protection on the existence of a contract, relatively few cohabitants are
likely to benefit given that, as one commentator aptly notes, “[i]f couples do
not think of their relationship in contract terms, then a doctrine that directs
courts to decide their disputes by looking for a contract is unlikely to find
one.”277
Nonetheless, two states that do offer protections for cohabitants whose
relationship has ended do so by analogizing to the states’ divorce laws. For
example, the Supreme Court of Nevada has held that property that
cohabitants agreed to hold “as if they were married” is subject to the state’s
community property laws.278 In so ruling, the court emphasized that it “by no
means seeks to encourage, nor does this opinion suggest, that couples should
avoid marriage.”279 Instead, the court “reaffirm[ed] this state's strong public
policy interest in encouraging legally consummated marriages.”280
Nonetheless, the court pointed out that “this policy is not furthered by
allowing one participant . . . to abscond with the bulk of the couple's
acquisitions.”281
Washington has gone one step further and eschews the contract approach
altogether, focusing instead on the existence of a “a stable, marital-like
relationship.”282 For cohabitants who establish the existence of such a
relationship (sometimes referred to as the “meretricious relationship test”283),
the Supreme Court of Washington has held that “income and property
acquired during [the relationship] should be characterized in a similar manner
as income and property acquired during marriage.”284 Washington courts
have even applied this approach to same-sex cohabitants, giving them
marriage-like remedies years before the state would permit same-sex
marriage. Consider, for instance, a 2004 case in which Lynn Gormley and
Julia Robertson were involved in a ten-year relationship.285 After examining
276

See Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 832
n.103 (2008) (“At least three states require a written contract when the consideration is
nonmarital conjugal cohabitation.”).
277
Ira Mark Ellman, "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2001).
278
W. States Const., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Nev. 1992).
279
Id. at 1223.
280
Id.
281
Id. at 1223-24.
282
See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (“A meretricious
relationship is a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge
that a lawful marriage between them does not exist.”).
283
See generally Gavin M. Parr, What Is A "Meretricious Relationship"?: An Analysis
of Cohabitant Property Rights Under Connell v. Francisco, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1243 (1999)
284
Connell, 898 P.2d at 836.
285
Gormley v. Robertson, 83 P.3d 1042, 1043 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
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the nature of the couple’s relationship, the court ruled that they were entitled
to an equitable division of property.286
In so ruling, the court rejected the argument that, because the two women
could not legally marry, their relationship could not be construed as “quasimarital”: “it is of no consequence to the cohabitating couple, same-sex or
otherwise, whether they can legally marry. Indeed, one of the key elements
of a meretricious relationship is knowledge by the partners that a lawful
marriage between them does not exist.”287 While agreeing that “[w]hether
same-sex couples can legally marry is for the legislature to decide,” the court
concluded that the duty to “‘examine the [meretricious] relationship and the
property accumulations and make a just and equitable disposition of the
property’” is a judicial, not a legislative, extension of the rights and
protections of marriage to intimate, unmarried cohabitants.”288
D. Informal Adoption
States have not only relied on informal acts to award marital benefits,
they also permit informal acts to justify recognition of certain parent-child
relationships. One such example is the doctrine of equitable adoption. Also
referred to as “virtual adoption,” “de facto adoption,” and “adoption by
estoppel,”289 equitable adoption is designed to protect individuals who
mistakenly believe themselves to be the legal child (whether biological or
through adoption) of another.290 The doctrine, which has been recognized in
a majority of the states,291 typically arises in the context of “parental”
disinheritance; however, courts have also relied on the doctrine in other areas

286

Id. at 1044 (“They pooled their resources and acquired property as well as debt. They
had a joint banking account that was used to pay all monthly obligations, whether preexisting
or incurred separately or jointly.”).
287
Id. at 1045.
288
Id. at 1046.
289
See Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The
Cultural Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225
(2008).
290
See Lindsay Ayn Warner, Bending the Bow of Equity: Three Ways Florida Can
Improve Its Equitable Adoption Policy, 38 STETSON L. REV. 577, 585 (2009) (“Equitable
adoption protect[s] the interests of a minor child who, through no fault of his or her own,
was never formally and legally adopted by his or her adoptive parents.”) (internal quotes
omitted).
291
See Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the Implications
for Inheritance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006) (“Since at least twenty-eight states do recognize
equitable adoption, the doctrine remains a theoretical option in a majority of states.”).
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as well, including divorce proceedings292 and claims of parental rights.293
Historically, equitable adoption has been “predicated on principles of
contract law and equitable enforcement of the agreement to adopt,”294 and
thus courts have typically required the existence of an adoption contract
before permitting a party to pursue a claim for equitable adoption.295
Requiring the existence of a contract, however, can work great injustice.
The case of O’Neal v. Wilkes provides an excellent example.296 There, Hattie
O’Neal was an African American child born in 1949 to an unwed mother,
who died when Hattie was only eight years old.297 Hattie was eventually sent
to Georgia to live with an aunt, who in turn placed Hattie with a married
couple, Mr. and Mrs. Roswell Cook, that were looking to adopt a little girl.298
Although the Cooks never formally adopted Hattie, from the time she went
home with the Cooks until she married in 1975, she was in all meaningful
ways their “daughter.”299 After Hattie left their home and got married, she
continued her relationship with the Cooks, who referred to Hattie’s children
as their “grandchildren.”300 When Mr. Cook died without a will, Hattie
brought suit, claiming that Cook had adopted her by way of a “virtual
adoption” and, as such, was entitled to inherit from him.301 The Supreme
Court of Georgia refused Hattie's claim for the sole reason that her aunt did
not have the legal authority to enter into an adoption contract with the
Cooks.302
Recognizing the unfairness that can arise from such a rigid requirement,
a number of states have instead started to rely “on equitable principles of

292
See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 109 (N.D. 2000) (“The substantive
circumstances of this case, a divorce in which child support was requested, are identical to
the other cases in which husbands have been held to have equitably adopted children for the
purposes of imposing child support.”).
293
See, e.g., Nguyen v. Boynes, 396 P.3d 774, 779 (Nev. 2017) (concluding “that the
district court did not err in granting Rob paternity through equitable adoption of the child”).
294
Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 606 (N.C. 1997) (quoting 2 Am.Jur.2d Adoption
§ 53 (1994)).
295
See Higdon, supra note 289, at 225 (“[T]he tests that courts have developed to
determine whether an equitable adoption exists almost invariably require that there first have
been a contract to adopt between the natural and ‘foster’ parents.”).
296
O'Neal v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. 1994).
297
Id. at 851.
298
Id.
299
Id. (“Although O'Neal was never statutorily adopted by Cook, he raised her and
provided for her education and she resided with him until her marriage in 1975.”).
300
Id.
301
Id.
302
Id. at 853 (“Because O'Neal's relatives did not have the legal authority to enter into a
contract for her adoption, their alleged ratification of the adoption contract was of no legal
effect.”).
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fairness and intent rather than the ordinary rules of contract law.”303
Consider, for instance, the 2013 case of DeHart v. DeHart in which the
Supreme Court of Illinois was confronted with an individual who was
disinherited by the man he had always believed to be his father.304 The
plaintiff, James Dehart, was born in 1944.305 For almost sixty years, the
decedent, Donald DeHart, had represented himself to the community as
James’ biological father.306 In addition, Donald even provided James with a
birth certificate that seemingly confirmed his parentage.307 In 2000, however,
James obtained a certified copy of his birth certificate, and it made clear that
his father was someone other than Donald.308
Donald subsequently conceded that he was not James’ biological father,
but that he had nonetheless adopted James in 1946.309 Consistent with that
representation, Donald continued to hold James out as his son.310 When
Donald subsequently died in 2007, however, his will included the statement
that “I have no children” and, indeed, it appeared that he had lied about
having adopted James.311 In that will, Donald left nothing to James but
instead left everything to a woman Donald had wed just two years prior to
his death.312 James filed a challenge to the will, arguing in part that had been
equitably adopted by Donald.313 Although Donald’s widow disputed the
claim, the court ruled in James’ favor, holding that “where there is sufficient,
objective evidence of an intent to adopt (or fraudulently or mistakenly
holding out as a natural child on a continual basis), supported by a close
enduring familial relationship, . . . equitable adoption [will] be
recognized.”314
In so ruling, Illinois joined other states that have permitted equitable
adoption claims even in the absence of a formal adoption contract. West
Virginia was seemingly the first state to do so when its highest court stated
that “[w]hile the existence of an express contract of adoption is very
convincing evidence, an implied contract of adoption is an unnecessary
303

DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85, 103 (Ill. 2013).
Id.
305
Id. at 90.
306
Id.
307
Id. (“Donald and plaintiff used the purported birth certificate, to conduct the affairs
of life (until the year 2000), using it to enroll plaintiff in grade school and high school and
using it to convey to those requesting proof of identity that plaintiff was Donald's son.”).
308
Id.
309
Id. (“Donald also explained in no uncertain terms that he had hired a lawyer in
Homewood, Illinois, to handle the adoption so that ‘it was all legal.’”).
310
Id.
311
Id. (“There is no legal documentation of an adoption in the record.”).
312
Id. at 91.
313
Id.
314
Id. at 104.
304
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fiction created by courts as a protection from fraudulent claims.”315
Accordingly, the court held that an equitable adoption could take place even
without a contract to adopt so long as the proponent “can, by clear, cogent
and convincing evidence, prove sufficient facts to convince the trier of fact
that his status is identical to that of a formally adopted child, except only for
the absence of a formal order of adoption.”316 California followed a similar
approach in 2004 when its highest court held that one who claims to be an
equitably adopted child need only “demonstrate the existence of some direct
expression, on the decedent's part, of an intent to adopt the claimant.”317 The
court explained that such intent could be established by the existence of “an
unperformed express agreement or promise to adopt”318 but can also arise
from “an invalid or unconsummated attempt to adopt, the decedent's
statement of his or her intent to adopt the child, or the decedent's
representation to the claimant or to the community at large that the claimant
was the decedent's natural or legally adopted child.”319
E. No Adoption and No Biological Link
Somewhat related to equitable adoption is the concept of equitable parent,
which different courts have referred to as quasi-parent, in loco parentis, and
psychological parent.320 Essentially, an equitable parent is one who gains
some parental rights as a result of having acted as a parent to a legally
unrelated child,321 typically with the consent of the legal parent.322 In a
growing number of cases, including Ramey v. Sutton that was discussed
earlier,323 same-sex partners have relied on claims of equitable parenthood to
gain parental rights over children with whom they lack a biological tie. After
all, medical science currently does not permit two people of the same gender
to conceive,324 meaning that children of same-sex couples will only have—
315

Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369, 374 (W. Va. 1978)
Id.
317
Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d 747, 754 (Cal. 2004).
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
See Higdon, supra note 186, at 944.
321
See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially A Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
429, 458 (2007) (defining a quasi-parent as “a person not a legal parent who nonetheless has
greater rights in a contest with the legal parent than does any other third party”).
322
See, e.g., In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435 (Wis. 1995) (adopting a
four-part test “[t]o demonstrate the existence of the petitioner's parent-like relationship with
the child” the first element of which is the “that the biological or adoptive parent consented
to, and fostered, the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
with the child”); see also supra note 136 and accompanying text.
323
See supra notes 127-136 and accompanying text.
324
As advances in assisted reproduction continue, even this may change. See Michael
316
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at most—a biological connection with one member of the same-sex
relationship.
Those in same-sex relationships, of course, are not the first to bring such
claims. Individuals who have acted as quasi-parents have a long history of
petitioning the courts for parental rights. Although they have not always been
successful, the point remains that this is yet one more area of family law
where the courts have been willing to bestow familial rights on those who
lack formal family relationships. Before looking at those cases, however, it
is important to understand that this is an area of the law that is rapidly
evolving, due in large part to the fact that family complexity has changed
drastically in the last few decades as a result of “higher rates of divorce,
nonmarital childbearing, cohabitation, and remarriage.”325 As a consequence
of those new dynamics, children today are more likely to look to individuals
as parents who are, in reality, “legal strangers.”326 Thus, courts are being
asked to increasingly wrestle with the difficult question of, in the absence of
a biological or legal connection to the child, can an individual can ever
become a “parent.” And, if so, how is a court to reconcile that recognition
with the parental rights of the child’s legal parents.
In several cases, including claims brought by cohabitants, courts have
seemed resistant to extend such recognition. For instance, Donald Merkel
cohabitated with his girlfriend, Tamera Cooper, and her son for seven
years.327 Despite being neither the child’s legal nor the biological father,
Donald nonetheless assumed responsibility for helping raise the boy.328
When the relationship between the two adults ended, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota refused to recognize him as an equitable parent: “Before a
parent's right to custody over his or her own children will be disturbed in
favor of a nonparent, a clear showing against the parent of ‘gross misconduct
or unfitness, or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of
the child’ is required.”329 Step-parents have faced similar difficulties. For
example, in a 2009 case out of Illinois, Nicholas Gansner and Miki Mancine
Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1065, 1093 (2016)
(discussing technologies whereby sperm cells might be converted to egg cells and vice versa,
permitting same-sex couples to reproduce).
325
Ariel Kalil et. al., Time Investments in Children Across Family Structures, 654
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 150 (2014)
326
The term “legal stranger” is often used as a synonym for “nonparent.” See John
Dewitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 351 (1998) (using “nonparent” and “legal stranger” interchangeably); David
D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the Ali Principles of Family
Dissolution, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1075, 1087 (2001) (noting that “long-time caregivers
lacking biological or adoptive ties are classified as nonparents, or legal ‘strangers’”).
327
Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253 (S.D.1991).
328
Id. at 254.
329
Id. at 255 (quoting Langerman v. Langerman, 336 N.W.2d 669, 670 (S.D.1983)).
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were married a few months after Miki adopted a son, William.330 Nicholas
never adopted William but nonetheless held himself out as William’s father
and served as the child’s primary caregiver.331 When Miki filed for divorce,
Nicholas petitioned for sole custody.332 The court, however, rejected his
argument, noting that the state had not recognized equitable parentage and
that Nicholas, despite knowing “at all times that he would have to formally
adopt William in order to be his legal parent,” failed to do so.333
Other courts have been more sympathetic to such claims. For instance,
in a 1992 case a Minnesota court granted visitation to a stepfather, David
Simmons, over the objections of the child’s mother, JoEllen Vasicheck.334
The couple had married in 1989.335 At the time, JoEllen had a 5-year old son
from a previous relationship.336 When the couple separated 18 months later,
David petitioned the court for visitation.337 While acknowledging that “the
question of whether a former stepparent may assert a common-law right
to visitation is one of first impression,” the court ruled in his favor.338
Specifically, the court held that “a former stepparent who was in loco
parentis with the former stepchild may be entitled to visitation under the
common law.”339 Finding nothing in the record to contradict the trial court’s
determination that visitation with David would be in the child’s best interest,
the court affirmed.340 A number of courts have offered similar relief to those
who fail to qualify as legal parents.341
Included within those cases are instances where courts have used
equitable parentage to bestow parental rights on those in same-sex
relationships. For instance, a North Carolina court, applying the best interest
of the child standard, awarded joint legal and physical custody of a child to
the mother, Irene Dwinnell, and the mother’s former partner, Joellen
330

In re Marriage of Mancine and Gansner, 9 N.E. 3d 550, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
Id. at 556.
332
Id.
333
Id. at 568.
334
Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
335
Id. at 789.
336
Id. (“[The] biological father has had no contact with him and has surrendered his
parental rights.”).
337
Id. at 790.
338
Id. 791.
339
Id. According to the court, “[b]ecause [the statute] does not contain any clause
specifically repealing, restricting, or abridging a non-parent's common-law visitation rights,
we construe the statute to extend and supplement the common-law rule.”
340
Id. at 792.
341
At least one court has relied on equitable adoption to extend parental rights to a samesex spouse. See Stankevich v. Milliron, 882 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (ruling
that a same-sex spouse could qualify as an “equitable parent” to the biological child of the
other spouse when that child was born during the marriage).
331
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Mason.342 Although the mother argued that the ruling would infringe her
constitutional rights to direct the upbringing of her child, the court announced
that “when a legal parent invites a third party into a child’s life, and that
invitation alters a child’s life by essentially providing him with another
parent, the legal parent’s rights to unilaterally sever that relationship are
necessarily reduced.”343 In so ruling, the court noted that the two women
“lived together as a family and Dwinnell led her child to believe that Mason
was one of his parents.”344
These cases illustrate but a few of the evolving family forms that have led
to increasing numbers of children being reared (sometimes exclusively) by
those who fail to qualify as a formal, legal parent. These cases likewise reveal
the degree to which the protections afforded equitable parents vary by state.
In light of the harms that can befall children when those they see as parents
are not treated as such by the law, a number of scholars have argued that state
law needs to be more consistent when it comes to recognizing equitable
parenthood and in providing those individuals with parental rights.345 The
same is true regarding backdating claims by those who are unable to count
the pre-equality portion of a same-sex relationship toward formal marriage
given the unconstitutional laws prohibiting such unions. Just as the states
have found ways to award family-like benefits to other relationships that fail
to meet the formal requirements of family law, so to must they find ways to
extend marital benefits to those who were in relationships that would have
been marital had that been a legal option. Although the states need not do so
in the same precise way, it is the position of this Article that Obergefell
demands some form of equitable remedy—one that currently does not exist
in the law but for which the above equitable remedies are highly instructive.
IV. EQUITABLE MARRIAGE
As detailed above, courts already possess a number of equitable doctrines
that enable them to extend family law protections to those who have spent
time in informal family-like relationships.346 Each owes its existence to the
courts’ desire to protect vulnerable citizens from the harms that can arise from
misplaced reliance on the existence of a formal domestic relationship.
Consider, for instance, someone who spends twenty years in a relationship
342

Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 69.
344
Id. at 68.
345
See generally Higdon, supra note 186, at 956 (“Although state variation is not an
inherently bad thing, discrimination on the basis of family structure and the ensuing harm
such discrimination plays in the lives of children is something the law cannot tolerate”).
346
See supra Part III.
343
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that she believes to be a marriage. Imagine that she does not work outside the
home, and all valuable property is in her spouse’s name. If it were somehow
revealed that the marriage was invalid, she would—absent some other
remedy—be left financially with very little to show for those twenty years
and have limited ability to now rebuild her life. It is primarily within this
space that these equitable doctrines operate.347 There is, however, another
concern at play and that is the goal of fulfilling party expectations.348 As
many courts have referenced when applying these doctrines, these individuals
entered into these relationships in good faith, assuming that they would be
protected or, at the very least, not jeopardizing their economic self-interests
in the process.
Those concerns apply with equal force in the context of those who spent
time in same-sex relationships that would have been marriages but for the
unconstitutional laws preventing such unions. In truth, those individuals are
even more entitled to some sort of protection given the constitutional right at
play. As a number of scholars have made clear, this retroactive application of
Obergefell is not merely good policy, it is constitutionally required. For
instance, Lee-Ford Tritt has concluded that “Obergefell should be applied
purely retroactively as to both choice-of-law matters and remedial
considerations [so as to] rectif[y] the property deprivations of
unconstitutional unrecognized marriages.”349 Similarly, Peter Nicolas
explains that “[s]uch backdating provides same-sex couples with the ‘make
whole’ relief they are entitled to for past violations of their constitutional right
to marry.”350 Such sentiments are consistent with what the Supreme Court
itself has said regarding remedial decrees: “it must be designed as nearly as
possible to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.”351
347

See, e.g., supra notes 258 & 281 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 216 (Cal. 2013) (“Our court
made clear from the beginning that the fundamental purpose of the putative spouse doctrine
was to protect the expectations of innocent parties and to achieve results that are equitable,
fair, and just.”); W. States Const., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Nev. 1992) (“[T]his
court must protect the reasonable expectations of unmarried cohabitants with respect to
transactions concerning their property rights.”); Sol Lovas, When Is A Family Not A Family?
Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 IDAHO
L. REV. 353, 371 (1988) (“[C]ourts have developed the doctrines of ‘equitable adoption’ and
‘adoption by estoppel’ to protect the child's justifiable expectations.”); Kathryn S. Vaughn,
The Recent Changes to the Texas Informal Marriage Statute: Limitation or Abolition of
Common-Law Marriage?, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 1131, 1140 (1991) (“The first, and probably
most important, function of common-law marriage is protecting the good faith expectations
of the parties.”).
349
Tritt, supra note 17, at 945.
350
Nicolas, supra note 17, at 441.
351
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
348
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Thus, if those individuals are to be provided with true marriage equality,
some retroactivity is required. Unfortunately, none of the existing doctrines
are currently suited to address this particular situation. As a result, these
individuals require a new form of protection given that their relationships
either ended before marriage equality became the law of the land or their
eventual marriages fail to capture the true length of the relationship, upon
which a number of marital benefits are conditioned.352 The remainder of this
Part explores why, despite being inapposite in this context, the existing
doctrines are nonetheless instructive when it comes to crafting a new
equitable doctrine—referred to here as Equitable Marriage—that would offer
the necessary protections. With that in mind, this Part then puts forth concrete
suggestions on how Equitable Marriage should be applied and how courts
should deal with the potential criticisms and complications that could arise.
A. Filling the Equitable Void
To deal with same-sex relationships that pre-dated marriage equality, one
might ask why not simply bring back some form of common law marriage. It
is, after all, the only equitable doctrine of the five that gives formal
recognition, with all the attendant rights and obligations, to an informally
created relationship.353 In contrast, the others merely provide for limited
rights and remedies. Additionally, there is some precedence for using
common law marriage in this context. After Loving, courts took that approach
to retroactively extend marriage equality to interracial relationships that were
either already in existence354 or had ended before Loving.355 Further, as
discussed earlier, a few states have already relied on common law marriage
to retroactively convert some same-sex relationships into marriages.356
Nonetheless, there are a number of problems with relying on common
law marriage in this context. First, compared to the legal landscape at the time
Loving was decided, today only a small number of states permit common law
marriage, and that number continues to dwindle.357 In 2019, for instance, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina prospectively abolished the doctrine after
finding that it violated the public policy of the state, which “is to promote
predictable, just outcomes for all parties involved in these disputes, as well
717, 746 (1974)).
352
See supra Part II.A.
353
See supra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
354
See Nicolas, supra note 17, at 424-25.
355
See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lewis, 306 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. Ala. 1969)
(recognizing a common law marriage between interracial couple even though husband died
a few months before Loving was issued).
356
See supra notes 172-178 and accompanying text.
357
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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as to emphasize the sanctity of marital union.”358 Additionally, most states
abolished common law marriage through legislation,359 and thus resurrecting
the doctrine at this point could take considerable time and pose significant
political challenges.
Of greater salience, however, is the fact that the traditional tests for
common law marriage are largely based on outdated, heteronormative views
of what a marriage should look like. For instance, many states require that
parties prove that they cohabitated and had a reputation in the community as
being married in order to establish an informal marriage.360 However,
relationships today—even formal marriages—are less likely to satisfy those
elements. Married couples are more likely today to live separately,361 and
with the reduced societal stigma concerning romantic relationships outside of
marriage, they are less likely to proclaim to those around them that they are,
in fact, married.362 This is especially true when considering same-sex couples
who may have feared discrimination and scorn had they openly shared their
relationship status with others. In that sense, cases dealing with common law
marriage claims involving interracial couples are instructive. For instance, in
1904, the Supreme Court of Missouri refused to recognize a common law
marriage between a couple that lived together for thirty years, had eight
children, and referred to one another as husband and wife.363 The problem
was that the two failed the reputation requirement because “he was never
known to be with her and acknowledge her as his wife outside of his own
house.”364 The reason he had not done so was clearly because he was White
and she was Black, but the court gave no weight to that fact.365
358
See Stone v. Thompson, 833 S.E.2d 266 (S.C. 2019). The court would, however,
continue to recognize common law marriages effectuated prior to that date. Id. at 267
(“[F]rom this date forward—that is, purely prospectively—parties may no longer enter into
a valid marriage in South Carolina without a license.”).
359
See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships:
The 2003 California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil
Rights and Family Law Perspective, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1555, 1577 (2004) (“[D]uring the
past two centuries, common law marriage has been legislatively abolished in most states.”).
360
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
361
See Simon Duncan, Why More Couples Are Choosing to Live Apart, THE
CONVERSATION (Jan. 3, 2020) (“Not only is it surprisingly common, but living apart together
is increasingly seen as a new and better way for modern couples to live.”):
https://theconversation.com/why-more-couples-are-choosing-to-live-apart-124532
362
Stone, 833 S.E.2d 269 (“By and large, society no longer conditions acceptance upon
marital status or legitimacy of children.”).
363
Keen v. Keen, 83 S.W. 526 (Mo. 1904).
364
Id. at 527.
365
See also Vetrano v. Gardner, 290 F. Supp. 200, 206 (N.D. Miss. 1968) (refusing to
find a common law marriage even though it was “suggested that the parties would have
conducted themselves publicly as husband and wife but for their fear of prosecution under
state criminal statutes banning interracial marriage”).
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There is one final reason that common law marriage does not work
particularly well in the context of same-sex relationships that pre-date
marriage equality, and it is a problem also shared by the marriage validation
principles of marriage by estoppel and putative marriage. Namely, all three
operate on the assumption that there was in fact a marriage, albeit one that is
invalid or was entered into informally. Indeed, the essential requirement for
common law marriage is a shared intent of the parties to be legally married.366
Thus, common law marriage requires, not that the parties subjectively
believed their relationship to be the equivalent of a marriage, but that they
intended to enter into a relationship that they believed would be recognized
as a legal marriage.367 In fact, states that allow common law marriage require
the parties to have first had the capacity to marry, meaning that they could
have obtained a formal marriage had they so chose.368 However, at the heart
of the marriage equality movement lies the fact that same-sex couples were
denied that capacity. Thus, for those who entered into same-sex relationships
before gaining the right to legally wed, they may have considered themselves
the equivalent of married, but they were always well aware that it was an
extralegal relationship that came with no marital benefits or protections.369
Likewise, marriage by estoppel assumes that, although there may have
been an invalid divorce, there was a subsequent marriage ceremony that was
otherwise valid.370 Thus, that doctrine has limited utility here because,
besides the fact it only operates in a very specific factual setting, a subsequent
marriage was something same-sex couples simply could not obtain prior to
marriage equality. Similarly, putative spouse doctrine requires a showing that
there was a marriage ceremony, and the parties entered into that “marriage”
in good faith.371 Again, prior to earning the right to marry, same-sex couples
could not meet that requirement. It is true that the law could retroactively
treat—as some states have done through legislation372—civil unions and
domestic partnerships as marriages, but that too fails because 1) relatively
few states even offered those marriage alternatives373 and 2) like marriage
366

See supra notes 214 and accompanying text.
See Morrow v. Dillard, 257 So. 3d 316, 324 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (“In order ‘[t]o
establish a common-law marriage, there must be a present agreement or mutual
understanding to enter into the marriage relationship.’”).
368
See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
369
See, e.g., Swicegood v. Thompson, No. 2018-000008, 2020 WL 3551786, at *1 (S.C.
Ct. App. July 1, 2020) (“Thompson attested Swicegood knew they were not married. She
stated she and Swicegood participated in a ‘commitment ceremony’ . . . but they knew it was
not a wedding and that they could not legally marry.”).
370
See supra notes 238-252 and accompanying text.
371
See supra notes 253-265 and accompanying text.
372
See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
373
See, e.g., Mitchell L. Engler, Edward D. Stein, Not Too Separate or Unequal:
Marriage Penalty Relief After Obergefell, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1088 (2016) (“By 2012,
367
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equality itself, those options did not become available until after many samesex couples had already spent years in a committed relationship.374 Finally, a
putative spouse is not entitled to the full panoply of marital benefits, thus
making it a less than ideal template in this context.375
For that reason, the law of cohabitation may appear a better alternative,
but it too fails in this context. First, that doctrine and its attendant remedies
are directed solely at nonmarriage, and in order to achieve true marriage
equality, there needs to be some mechanism for treating an informal
relationship as an actual marriage. Second, most states that permit cohabitants
to avail themselves to marriage-like protections do so through contract law—
often requiring express, written agreements.376 The contract requirement is
problematic here because, even if one could succeed on that theory, the
remedy is limited to the terms of the contract and not the full range of
marriage benefits. Further, it is unlikely that same-sex couples who were in
committed relationships awaiting the right to legally marry would have even
thought of their relationships as a contract, much less in express terms that
they then reduced to writing. There is, however, at least one state that does
not require an agreement, but instead looks to the quality of the
relationship.377 Nonetheless, it still only provides successful litigants with
some of the benefits of marriage. It does not permit a finding that the couple
was in fact married, thus denying them the full “constellation of benefits” to
which Obergefell spoke.378
What remains, then, are the equitable doctrines relating to parent-child
relationships. Although neither pertains to marriage, they nonetheless
provide helpful examples of how courts have constructed remedies that allow
courts to extend family law protections to those who fail—at least formally—
to qualify as “family.” As an initial matter, they both share the same defects
as some of the other doctrines, the most notable of which is the limited
remedies they provide. For instance, succeeding as an equitable parent merely
. . . nine states allowed same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships.”).
374
California was the first to pass a domestic partnership registry in 1999, and Vermont
was the first to pass legislation permitting civil unions in 2000. See David B. Oppenheimer
et. al., Religiosity and Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 32 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 195, 197 (2014).
375
See, e.g., Allen v. W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Tr. Fund, 788 F.2d 648, 650
(9th Cir. 1986) (“Marriage is a status precisely defined in California and does not cover
putative spouses.”); Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1131 (Nev. 2004) (declining “to
extend the[putative spouse] doctrine to permit an award of spousal support”); Helen Chang,
California Putative Spouses: The Innocent, the Guilty, and the Law, 44 SW. L. REV. 327, 328
(2014) (“Only certain benefits and privileges of a legal marriage are available to putative
spouses.”).
376
See supra notes 274-277 and accompanying text.
377
See supra notes 282-288 and accompanying text.
378
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015).
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provides the possibility of some discrete parental rights—it does not
recognize the equitable parent as a legal parent.379 Likewise, establishing that
one has been equitably adopted only provides limited remedies vis-à-vis the
rights afforded formally adopted children.380 Further, as detailed earlier, most
states are fairly formalistic when it comes to applying these doctrines. In
equitable adoption, for example, most courts insist on the existence of an
unfulfilled adoption contract, which may be unusual in situations where
informal adoption is likely to occur.381 Relatedly, equitable parentage cases
often focus too much on the role the legal parent played in cultivating the
relationship between the child and the quasi-parent and not enough on the
quality of the relationship that developed between the two or the harm that
would result from failing to protect that relationship.382
Nonetheless, a survey of the states that have applied these doctrines
reveal that a few have instead adopted a more nuanced approach, one that is
similar to how Washington deals with unmarried partners.383 Specifically,
these courts have utilized a functional approach, which “focuses the inquiry
on whether the relationship at issue shares the essential characteristics of a
traditionally accepted relationship and fulfills the same human needs.”384
Although such an approach might appear to be the minority approach
regarding these doctrines, family law as a whole has increasingly moved in
the functional direction.385 It is the position of this Article that a similar
approach would be well-suited in this context as well, providing courts with
the necessary flexibility to examine same-sex relationships that pre-dated
marriage equality.
Thus, what courts need is a new doctrine, referred to here as Equitable
379

See, e.g., In re P.L., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 6, 8–9 (Cal. App. 2005) (“De facto parents have
limited rights [and] that status does not give them the rights accorded to a parent or legal
guardian.”).
380
See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright, Inheritance Equity: Reforming the Inheritance Penalties
Facing Children in Nontraditional Families, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 46–47 (2015)
(“The doctrine provides limited remedies when a functional parent *47 dies intestate, but
virtually no remedy for the plethora of ancillary rights dependent upon the legal status of
being a parent or a child.”).
381
See supra notes 294-295 and accompanying text.
382
Although some states are willing to consider harm, the harm has to be fairly severe
before the court will act on that basis. See, e.g., Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 445 (Conn.
2002) (holding that a quasi-parent can only justify state interference with the rights of the
child's legal parent(s) if the quasi-parent can prove that the child will otherwise “suffer real
and substantial emotional harm”).
383
See supra notes 282-288 and accompanying text.
384
Brad Sears, Winning Arguments/losing Themselves: The (Dys)functional Approach
in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559, 566 (1994).
385
See Kate Redburn, Zoned Out: How Zoning Law Undermines Family Law's
Functional Turn, 128 YALE L.J. 2412, 2422 (2019) (“In many states, parentage and
partnership doctrines have taken a ‘functional turn’ over the past forty years.”).
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Marriage, which would draw upon elements of the existing approaches to
recognizing informal relationships. At a minimum, this doctrine would need
to give the courts license to extend benefits to a marriage-like relationship
that cannot otherwise qualify as a legal marriage. In that sense, this new
doctrine would be similar to the marriage validation principles of marriage
by estoppel and putative marriage, which protect void marriages, and
equitable parentage and adoption, which protect informal parent-child
relationships. However, unlike those doctrines, this new equitable doctrine
needs to provide not just some family law protections, but all of the rights
and obligations associated with marriage. In that sense, its remedy would be
akin to that of common law marriage, which confers all the benefits
associated with formal marriage. At the same time, however, the approach
that is needed in this context cannot share common law marriage’s rigid,
outdated definition of marriage. Nor, like typical cohabitation law and
equitable adoption, can it blindly insist on the existence of a contractual
relationship. Instead, it should take a more functional approach, similar to
that taken by a minority of courts regarding cohabitation, equitable adoption,
and equitable parentage. Finally, given the fundamental right at issue, this
doctrine requires nationwide application (in whatever precise form each state
decides) in order to remedy the constitutional harms that stem from the states’
history of refusing to permit same-sex marriage.
B. Applying Equitable Marriage
At its most basic level, Equitable Marriage would allow an individual
who spent time in a same-sex relationship prior to the legalization of samesex marriage to argue that some portion of that relationship should be
considered either the equivalent of a legal marriage or, in the case of a couple
that ultimately did wed, as part of that eventual marriage. In order to prevail,
a claimant would have to demonstrate that the parties would have wed during
that period if the law had permitted them to do so. Finally, for those who
succeed, the court would then rule that there was a legal marriage during that
period of the relationship—a remedy that, like common law marriage, brings
with it all the “same terms and conditions” as formal marriage.386
Given the large number of LGBTQ Americans living today who were in
same-sex relationships impacted by the denial of marriage equality, it is likely
that individuals from that group will be asking courts for such relief for years
to come. As courts grapple with how to respond to such claims, Equitable
Marriage offers a way of not only addressing them, but doing so in a way that
fulfills Obergefell’s promise of true marriage equality. Still, as courts
386

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
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implement such a doctrine, a number of questions are likely to arise—
questions the remainder of this section identifies and attempts to address.
1. Who Has Standing?
As an initial matter, the question arises as to who would be permitted to
raise an Equitable Marriage claim and whether there would be any time limits
for doing so. There are two groups of people who could conceivably raise
such claims. First are those individuals who ultimately wed a same-sex
partner with whom they had enjoyed a nonmarital relationship prior to
obtaining the right to legally wed.387 The second group includes those who
were in a nonmarital relationship that ended, either through divorce or
dissolution, prior to the arrival of formal marriage equality. Individuals in
either category would have the potential to raise a claim of Equitable
Marriage.
It would only be a potential claim given that some states may opt to
impose some time limits, and there are two such restrictions that could come
into play. First, for those who ultimately did wed and are seeking to backdate
their wedding date to an earlier point in time, there is the question of how
soon after obtaining the right to marry did the couple wed. For instance,
claimants would certainly be more sympathetic if they were part of a couple
that requested and received a marriage license the very day their state started
issuing marriage licenses. For those who did not immediately wed, however,
the issue gets a bit more complicated. Planning a wedding can certainly take
time, but imagine a couple that waited five years after their state started
issuing licenses before finally entering into a formal marriage. Given that
marital backdating would remain somewhat of an extraordinary remedy, the
states may feel it only fair to reserve that remedy to those who promptly did
all they could to formalize their relationship once given the ability to do so.
Thus, it may well be that states are correct in refusing claims for equitable
marriage by those who waited too long to marry after receiving the right to
do so.
States must be mindful, however, of not unfairly punishing those who do
not immediately wed. For a historical example of states doing just that,
consider how the southern states, following passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment, forced former slaves to either promptly wed or face criminal
conviction. Specifically, “[t]hose who were already in cohabitating
relationships were told to immediately legalize their unions and legitimize

387

Because different states recognized that right at different points in time, see supra
Part I, it is the assumption of this Article that Equitable Marriage would consider when
marriage equality became available in the state the same-sex couple resided.
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their children and grandchildren.”388 At least one southern state gave the
former slaves just six months to do so or be subject “to criminal prosecution
for adultery and fornication.”389 Thus, as Katherine Franke has discussed,
“the robust enforcement of bigamy, fornication, and adultery laws served to
domesticate African American people who were either unaware of, or
ignored, the formal requirements of marital formation and dissolution.”390
In requiring that same-sex couples promptly marry in order to evidence
an intention to wed earlier than they had been legally permitted to do so, states
must be mindful that imposing too short of a deadline would continue to
promote the very discrimination Obergefell was aimed at ending. There is,
unfortunately, one case where that has already occurred. In Ferry v. De
Longhi America, Inc., a case arising out of California, Patrick Ferry and
Randy Sapp started living together in 1985.391 In 1993, they “were married
in a religious ceremony performed by a religious leader pursuant to the
principles of [their] beliefs.”392 The two men lived together until December
of 2013, when Randy tragically died as a result of a heater that allegedly
malfunctioned.393 When Patrick brought a wrongful death action, the
manufacturer moved to dismiss on the basis that Patrick was not Randy’s
legal spouse and, thus, lacked standing.394 The court agreed, noting that
same-sex marriage became legal in California in June 2013 and, thus, the two
men could have legally wed prior to Randy’s death if they had so intended.395
In essence, then, the two men had lived as a married couple for over thirty
years but were punished for not obtaining a marriage license in the six months
between finally gaining the right to do so and Randy’s death.
A second potential time restriction relates to when someone could bring
a claim for Equitable Marriage. For those who ultimately wed, it would seem
they would have to do so at the point in time—most likely death or divorce—
when they are being denied a marriage benefit on the basis of marital length.
However, states might do what Utah has done regarding common law
marriage and condition backdating on the requirement that the spouses first
388

HUNTER, supra note 2, at 236.
Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399, 1421 (2004).
390
Katherine M. Franke, Becoming A Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African
American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 257 (1999).
391
276 F. Supp. 3d 940, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
392
Id. at 943. According to Patrick, “Had it been possible to do so [they] would have
obtained a marriage license.” Id.
393
Id.
394
Id. at 944-45.
395
Id. at 949-50. Per the court, “the act of obtaining a marriage license is an
administrative burden that all couples must bear if they wish to avail themselves of the legal
rights and privileges of a formal marriage.” Id. at 952.
389
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petition the court, either during the relationship or within one year of its
termination, for an order setting the start date of their marriage at a point
earlier than when they formally wed.396 The benefit of such an approach is
that it forces individuals in this position to ask for backdating sooner rather
than later, when problems of proof may be exacerbated by the passage of time
or the death or incapacity of one of the spouses.
The question is more complex though when applied to those whose samesex relationships ended before they were permitted to marry. To illustrate,
consider two men who were in a long-term relationship that began in 1995
but ended in 2010 when the couple decided to go their separate ways. One of
the men dies in 2021. The other wants to claim that he should receive
widower’s benefits, and so he brings a claim for equitable marriage in which
he argues that the two would have wed prior to 2010 if permitted to do so.
There are a few ways states might deal with such issues. First, the court could
simply treat it as a marriage that was never legally terminated. That would
pose problems if either had subsequently remarried. However, under the
subsequent marriage presumption, most states would honor the later
marriage, presuming that the earlier one ended in divorce before the
subsequent marriage took place, and it would be very hard for the surviving
partner to prove otherwise.397 If neither had “remarried,” then the claimant
would be permitted to prove the existence of an Equitable Marriage.
A better solution, however, might be for states to create a statute of
limitations that applies to those who wish to have a pre-equality relationship
adjudicated as a marriage. Texas, for instance, provides that a claimant’s
ability to establish a common law marriage will fail “[i]f a proceeding in
which a marriage is to be proved . . . is not commenced before the second
anniversary of the date on which the parties separated and ceased living
together.”398 States could implement something similar regarding Equitable
Marriage for those who seek marital benefits from a relationship that ended
before the arrival of formal marriage equality. However, the event that would
start the clock in this context would likely need to be the date upon which the
state began recognizing Equitable Marriage given that many of these
relationships might have already ended many years earlier.
2. How Would a Claimant Prove an Equitable Marriage?
One might ask, given the deprivations they have faced regarding
marriage, why not simply give same-sex couples the benefit of the doubt and
396

See UTAH CODE § 30-1-4.5 (2011).
See Higdon, supra note 179, at 117 (“In essence, the subsequent marriage
presumption operates by presuming a divorce, when in fact, one likely never occurred.”).
398
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (West)
397
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automatically presume that any relationship that existed prior to marriage
equality was a marriage that is entitled to all the corresponding rights and
benefits. There are two responses to that question. First, such a permissive
approach could very easily give rise to fraudulent claims, especially
considering that such claims might not arise until after the alleged spouse has
died. Second, marriage does not simply bring benefits, it also brings
obligations. Accordingly, whenever an individual succeeds in backdating a
same-sex marriage, that person’s spouse then has marital obligations—
obligations that person may have never intended to bear. In other words,
backdating a same-sex marriage might be very beneficial to one spouse, but
it can also be quite damaging to the other.399 Thus, more careful consideration
is required if the law is to adequately protect both members of the same-sex
couple.
Indeed, not every same-sex relationship that came into being prior to
formal marriage equality would have been a marriage. To begin with, the
decision to marry typically does not arise until after some period of
courtship,400 which could take as much time as the couple deems necessary.
Thus, just because a claimant can prove the existence of a pre-equality
relationship, does not mean the parties would have been married at that
particular point in time. Further, with the reduced social stigma associated
with cohabitation,401 a growing number of opposite-sex couples consciously
choose not to marry, and those same considerations could have easily
influenced same-sex couples to elect to do the same even if they had the
option. Additionally, some same-sex couples may have possessed unique
reasons for rejecting the idea of marriage, most notable of which is the belief
399

Relatedly, if one partner dies, retroactively finding a marriage can have significant
harms on the deceased partner’s heirs if that person died intestate. See, e.g., Irene D. Johnson,
There's A Will, but No Way-Whatever Happened to the Doctrine of Testamentary Freedom
and What Can (Should) We Do to Restore It?, 4 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 105,
123 (2011) (“Intestate succession statutes send a decedent's property to a spouse and
children, or if there is no spouse or children, then to blood relatives.”).
400
One scholar has described marriage as having four distinct stages:
[T]he courtship stage, in which the couple meets and decides to marry;
the entry stage, in which the couple undergoes whatever licensing and
ceremonial requirements are necessary to achieve marital status; the
intact marriage stage, in which the couple is legally married; and the exit
stage, in which the couple divorces, has the marriage annulled, or one of
the spouses dies.
Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625,
1628 (2007)
401
See Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97
B.U. L. REV. 425, 444 (2017) (noting that, “[t]oday, there is less social stigma associated
with living in a nonmarital family”).
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by some in the LGBTQ community that “it puts undue emphasis on a
heteronormative institution.”402 As one commentator recently described,
“[g]ay marriage is not without controversy, even among LGBT rights
activists. Queer theorists, radical feminists, and libertarians like Judith Butler,
Martha Fineman, and David Boaz, reject gay marriage and advocate for the
abolition of marriage in general.”403
Thus, for all those reasons, the question arises as to how courts are to, ex
post, differentiate between same-sex relationships that would have been
marriages and those that would not. Even those that would have been
marriages at some point prior to formal marriage equality, the question
becomes when did the relationship reach that point. And all of these questions
are even made more complicated by the fact that, once the same-sex
relationship ends, the two parties may have very different perspectives on
what was intended at any one point in time. Failure to get it right could be
quite damaging to one or both individuals in the same-sex relationship.
Consider, for instance, In re Estate of Leyton, where a New York court
declined to backdate a same-sex marriage when doing so would have harmed
the surviving member of that relationship.404 There, Mauricio Leyton’s
mother and sister brought suit to have his former partner, David Hunter,
disqualified as a beneficiary under Mauricio’s will.405 When Mauricio died,
his will identified David as his “former romantic partner and long-time
friend.”406 Mauricio’s family argued that, under New York law, David was a
“former spouse,” and thus he should be disqualified as a beneficiary.407 The
two men were never formally married. They did, however, have a
commitment ceremony in 2002 but eventually separated.408 As a result,
Mauricio’s family argued that “because the minister at the commitment
ceremony observed that the [Mauricio and David] were entering into a state
of companionship that the world recognizes as marriage, they were in fact
married, and therefore their subsequent separation was a divorce.”409 The
lower court denied the family members’ claim on the basis that same-sex
marriage was not permitted in New York until 2011.410 The appellate court
402

David Luban, The Moral Complexity of Cause Lawyers Within the State, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 705, 709 (2012).
403
Jessica Brown, Human Rights, Gay Rights, or Both? International Human Rights
Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 28 FLA. J. INT'L L. 217, 221 (2016).
404
In re Estate of Leyton, 22 N.Y.S.3d 422, 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
405
In re Leyton, 2015 WL 3882524, at *1 (N.Y.Sur. June 16, 2015) (“The relief sought
would increase petitioners' interests as beneficiaries under the will.”).
406
Id.
407
Id. (relying on N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(a)(4) (McKinney 2017)).
408
Id.
409
Id.
410
Id. (“Here, petitioners seek to have this court apply the Marriage Equality Act
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affirmed but further noted that Obergefell “does not compel a retroactive
declaration” that a marriage existed in this instance, holding that “according
the union between decedent and Hunter retroactive legal effect would be
inconsistent with their understanding that they had never been legally
married.”411
The challenge, then, is “to design clear criteria that separate marriage-like
unions from those in which the parties are not married because they do not
want marital commitment or obligations.”412 And when it comes to setting
that criteria, at least one scholar has advocated for “bright-line markers.”413
Specifically, Allison Tait has proposed that courts look to “instances of clear
legal intention to form an economic partnership.”414 Tait includes within that
category such things as asset-specific events, such as the purchase of a family
home; the date upon which the couple entered into an alternative marital state
like a civil union or a domestic partnership; and other legal contracts that
signal “shared purpose and relationship commitment.”415 It is the position of
this Article that these “legal markers” would indeed be excellent indicators
for courts to rely upon when deciding whether a same-sex relationship that
pre-dated marriage equality would have been marital or was instead
intentionally nonmarital.
Courts, however, must be willing to delve deeper. As discussed earlier in
the context of cohabitation and equitable adoption,416 relying too heavily on
legal formalities will discriminate against a number of same-sex couples. For
instance, only a small number of states even permitted same-sex couples to
enter into civil unions and domestic partnerships.417 Thus, those who lived in
states without that option would be at a disadvantage if courts were to place
undue weight on those marriage alternatives. Further, even those states that
did offer that option, did so only relatively recently,418 meaning that many
individuals in those states had already spent years in a same-sex relationship
before they even had the choice of entering into a civil union or domestic
partnership.
retroactively to the commitment ceremony, deeming that ceremony as formalizing a
marriage and the subsequent separation as a divorce.”).
411
22 N.Y.S.3d at 423.
412
Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 258 (2004).
413
See Allison Anna Tait, DIVORCE EQUALITY, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1303 (2015).
414
Id.
415
Id. at 1303-06. According to Tait, “[v]ivil unions, registered domestic partnerships,
designated beneficiary relationships, and relationship contracts all enable couples to signal a
clear legal intent.” Id. at 1306.
416
See supra Part III.C. & D.
417
See note 373 and accompanying text.
418
See note 374 and accompanying text.
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Somewhat relatedly, if courts were to rely too heavily on contractual
arrangements between same-sex partners—such as designated beneficiary or
cohabitation agreements419—as a proxy for their earlier desire to marry, that
would penalize those individuals who were ignorant of such options or who
lacked access to the legal representation required to effectuate such
agreements.420 Relying too heavily on the acquisition of joint property, like
a family home, would likewise have a disproportionate impact on those who
were in less affluent relationships—ones that could not afford such
purchases. In short, relying exclusively on “bright-line” markers would fail
to account for various ways in which same-sex couples might have expressed
their commitment to one another when formal marriage was not an option.
As a result, it is the position of this Article that courts should look beyond
discrete markers and instead adopt a more functional approach. Unlike the
more rigid approaches courts have taken regarding cohabitation and equitable
adoption, courts should permit claimants to rely on other evidence that the
couple would have married had that option been available. For instance, as
evidenced by the equitable parentage cases discussed earlier,421 the fact that
the two parties made the decision to have and jointly raise children should
likewise have bearing on the question of Equitable Marriage. States that
permit common law marriage already take into account such evidence when
deciding whether there was an informal marriage,422 and it would thus seem
odd to apply a more restrictive test here in light of the remedial nature of a
doctrine like Equitable Marriage, especially when such a remedy is likely
constitutionally required.
Similarly, the cohabitation and reputation requirements of common law
marriage should likewise play some role in Equitable Marriage. Individuals
who were in same-sex relationships that involved many years of living
together should be able to at least present that evidence and have the court
consider it. After all, “in the case of long-term relationships—especially those
accompanied by economic dependency and specification of roles—extra419

See Tait, supra note 413, at 1306.
Tait acknowledges these limitations. See id. at 1309 (“Using legal markers privileges
those individuals who have access to legal representation and can write cohabitation
agreements, wills, and other legal documents.”).
421
See supra Part III.E.
422
See, e.g., Seabrook v. Simmons, No. 2005-UP-459, 2005 WL 7084298, at *3 (S.C.
Ct. App. July 19, 2005) (noting that the preponderance of the evidence supported the
conclusion that the parties had effectuated a common law marriage, including the fact that
they had two children together); see also Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History
of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 971 (2000) (“[I]n cases involving children, who
would be deemed illegitimate if a court found their parents' relationship nonmarital, courts
recognizing common law marriages clung to a similar presumption in favor of legitimacy as
opposed to illegitimacy.
420
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contractual considerations like protecting weaker, dependent parties, take on
a greater weight.”423 Indeed, as one scholar points out, “long-term
cohabitation and joint ownership of property might be the best indicator that
two people expect to be able to live out their lives enjoying the jointly-owned
property.”424 So too should those who publicly represented themselves as
being in a committed relationship —either through general reputation in the
community or through informal declarations like a commitment ceremony—
be permitted to rely on that evidence to prove that that they would have
married had that choice been available.
This is not to say that any of this evidence, by itself, should be dispositive
or an earlier intent to wed. After all, the evidence could objectively indicate
more than one possible intent, and the parties themselves may not be
particularly helpful in sorting that out given that “at the dissolution of a
relationship, parties may easily disagree or remember differently what intent
existed at what point in time.”425 Nonetheless, to foreclose claimants from
even raising such evidence, and instead allowing only specific events to serve
as evidence of marital intent would fail to recognize the nuance that is
necessary to achieve true marriage equality in any meaningful way. As
Jeffrey Evan Stake observed: “What different people want and expect out of
marriage, and divorce, is not the same, probably ought not be the same, and
in any case cannot be made the same.”426
That last point has particular salience in this context. Namely,
homosexual relationships are not identical to heterosexual relationships.
Many of those who spent time in same-sex relationships prior to marriage
equality grew up in a society where marriage was not only impossible, but
the relationships they were permitted to have were both marginalized and, in
many respects, demonized. In light of those societal forces, it is entirely
reasonable to assume that those same-sex relationships would look somewhat
different from traditional marriages that were occurring around the same
time. Thus, as courts go about trying to discern whether a prior same-sex
relationship would have been a marriage, they must be careful to not be
overly swayed by heterosexist conceptions of what marriage should look like.
In that sense, the words of Paula Ettlebrick, which she uttered in 1989 when
marriage equality was only a whisper, are particularly instructive: “The
423

Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward A Pluralist Regulation of
Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1621 (2009)
424
Patricia A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481,
516 (2009); see also Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the
Possibility of A Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1864 (1987) (describing “long-term
cohabitation” as “evidence presumptive of marriage”).
425
Tait, supra note 413, at 1308 n. 323,
426
Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397, 398–
99 (1992)
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moment we argue . . . that we should be treated as equals because we are
really just like married couples and hold the same values to be true, we
undermine the very purpose of our movement and begin the dangerous
process of silencing our different voices.”427
Many of these differences were explored earlier when discussing how
common law marriage provides a less than ideal remedy in this context.428
Specifically, same-sex couples who faced discrimination and hostility over
their relationship status may have been less likely to live together as well as
announce their relationship status to the larger community. But there is
another key difference as well, and that relates to the gender stereotypes often
associated with marriage. As courts attempt to look back in time to determine
whether a same-sex relationship would have been a marriage, they will be
unable to rely on the popular stereotypes of the “working husband” and
“homemaker wife.” There is a great deal of literature about how so much of
family law has been built on those stereotypes,429 but one of the most recent
examples, which is particularly instructive in this context, is the law of
nonmarriage and cohabitation. As Albertina Antognini has pointed out, in
looking at cases that wrestle with whether to extend marital benefits to
cohabitating couples based on how closely those relationships resemble a
marriage, “[t]he overarching definition of marriage that these decisions
impose is one steeped in archetypal gender relations.”430 When analyzing
relationships involving two men or two women, however, such defaults are
even less likely to be effective and, thus, the law must “confront[] the sleeping
dog, by challenging the rigidity of gender role and identity that conspires with
political will to deny the creative possibility and richness in all lives of
committed intimate relation.”431
Thus, just as Obergefell distilled marriage down to the four essential
attributes that rendered it a fundamental right,432 so too must courts discern
what are the hallmarks of marital relationships—after heterosexist notions are
stripped away—that would allow an individual in a same-sex relationship to
prove an intent to be married during a time when that right was being
427
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unconstitutionally denied. Although the above discussion attempts to
delineate what form this evidence might take, courts must be mindful of the
lens through which they view that evidence. In short, no longer is it
permissible to use the pre-Obergefell construction of marriage.
CONCLUSION
In Obergefell, when discussing the flexible role that history and tradition
play in constitutional jurisprudence, the majority noted it “respects our
history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the
present.”433 Similarly, the courts cannot allow unconstitutional deprivations
from the past to continue harming people in the present. Thus, as courts
wrestle with how to fulfill Obergefell’s promise of true marriage equality,
they must be mindful of all the individuals who continue to face harm as a
result of the states’ denial of same-sex marriage through laws that, until 2015,
were considered perfectly legal in many states. Although some courts have
begun experimenting with ways to backdate marriages and thus ameliorate
those harms, states have done so on an inconsistent basis and none have
fashioned remedies that adequately capture the unique and varied attributes
of same-sex relationships in the United States. Thus, it is the position of this
Article that states do more. Specifically, by borrowing and expanding upon
the equitable doctrines that already exist for awarding family law benefits to
those in informal family-like relationships, the states must develop a doctrine
for recognizing Equitable Marriage in order to protect the rights and interests
of those individuals who spent time in relationships that would have been
marriages had an unconstitutional law not stood firmly in the way. In that
respect, the words of Justice Ginsburg in U.S. v. Virginia are instructive: “[a]
remedial decree . . . must closely fit the constitutional violation; it must be
shaped to place persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or
advantage in the position they would have occupied in the absence of
discrimination.”434
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